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“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to Rwanda, to Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?              
   UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his 2000 Millennium Report  
 
 
 
"I watched a little baby die today. Absolutely horrific … No one here can understand 
how the international community can let this happen. … There are just shells, rockets 
and tank fire pouring into civilian areas of this city, and it is just unrelenting".      
   Sunday Times’ journalist Marie Colvin from Homs, Syria, the day before she was 
killed by a Syrian military rocket fire. 
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Abstract 
The main topic of this thesis is to tackle the principle of Humanitarian intervention. 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was coined in 2001 as an evolution to the doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention (HI) with the aim to set precautions and conditions to 
govern the way the international community responds to humanitarian crises. The 
absence of defined rules or regulations to govern the international community’s 
response to humanitarian crises has rendered the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
perceived as a tool that can be used selectively by major powers to intervene in other 
countries according to their interests.  
The case of Kosovo (1999) when NATO forces launched military attacks against the 
Former Yugoslavian Republic (FYR) without a mandate from the UN Security 
Council, made it clear that the time was ripe by then for the adoption of a principled 
framework for humanitarian intervention. This framework was then proposed and 
coined later by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) and named the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). However, after the launch of 
R2P (2001) and the adoption of R2P at the UN World Summit (2005), the 
developments in Libya (2011) and Syria (2011-?) revealed that R2P has not provided 
substantive change to the pattern of the state reactions to humanitarian crises, political 
interests remained the dominant factors deciding intervention in case of humanitarian 
crises before and after R2P   
The thesis views that the launch of R2P constituted a historical opportunity to 
promote parameters and conditions for the international community to respond to 
humanitarian crisis in an automatic way away from any other considerations that 
could stem from particular interests or rivalry among major powers. However, the 
pattern of the international intervention in humanitarian crises after the R2P remained 
problematic. 
The main hypothesis of the thesis is throughout ages political interests were the 
dominant motive behind the decision of international intervention in humanitarian 
crises. Despite the great aspirations that accompanied the adoption of R2P, the pattern 
of international intervention under humanitarian reasons remained under the effect of 
the dominance of the political interests as it used to be before the adoption of R2P.  
The thesis will study different patterns of intervention in different eras before and 
after the adoption of R2P in order to demonstrate that political interests remained the 
dominant motive behind the decision of international intervention in humanitarian 
crises before and after R2P. 
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Conceptual Framework 
The Definition of Political Interests 
This thesis will adopt the definition of Hans Morgenthau regarding political interests. 
In his book “Politics among Nations”, he illustrates that the main signpost of political 
realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. He viewed that political 
realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional power being the control of 
man over man. According to Morgenthau, statesman must think in terms of national 
interests, conceived as power among other powers. According to him, the popular 
mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman’s thinking, reasons more often 
than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute 
evil.  However, he argued also that politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging: therefore it 
is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws.  
The Humanitarian Intervention 
The term Humanitarian intervention will be defined in this thesis as the use of force 
across state borders by a state or a group of states under allegations of preventing or 
ending grave violation of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than their 
own citizens without a permission of the host state. This definition excludes non-
forcible measures such as the diplomatic means or the economic sanctions, and 
excludes also the response to natural disasters. 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P):  
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) defines 
R2P as the responsibility of the state to provide protection for its own people. 
However, once a state becomes unable or unwilling to take such responsibility, this 
responsibility goes in a provisional matter to the international community.  
The Pillars of R2P 
The ICISS report identified three main pillars for R2P: the responsibility to prevent, 
the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to build. However, the thesis will 
adopt the three pillars of the 2005 UN World Summit which are: 
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling 
this responsibility.  
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other means to protect population from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to 
protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action 
to protect population, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
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Chapter One 
The Story of Humanitarian Intervention from the rise of the contemporary 
international relations till The Rise of R2P 
1.1 Introduction 
Humanitarian intervention is currently one of the fiercely debated issues in the 
contemporary international relations.  Although once upon time called an aberration 
in international relation, it is now a compelling foreign policy issue (Seybolt 2007). 
The current statistics of global conflicts demonstrates that the overwhelming majority 
of today's armed conflicts have turned throughout the twentieth century from the 
dominance of international armed conflicts at the beginning of the century to the 
dominance of non-international armed conflicts at the end of it (ICISS, International 
commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). More importantly, the ratio 
of civilians killed in non-international armed conflicts in relation to the whole 
numbers of civilians killed in armed conflicts (international or non-international) has 
increased dramatically from around one in ten at the beginning of the twentieth 
century to approximately nine out of ten at the end of the century. (Ibid, PP 13) 
The debate regarding military intervention in non-international armed conflicts that 
have striking humanitarian dimensions has been an issue of controversy since the 
early rise of the contemporary international relations after the peace of Westphalia. 
The cases of intervention or non-intervention, or even the cases of late/ failed 
intervention have raised a torrent of criticism. In many cases, international 
intervention has created more carnage than it averted. 
The selective pattern while deciding intervention in cases of humanitarian crises, as 
well as the rising figures of causalities resulting from non-international armed 
conflicts, has put the international conscience in the dilemma of how to reconcile the 
founding principles of the UN charter regarding the non-intervention from one hand, 
and the goal of "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war" from the 
other.  
The repetition of the cases of selective international intervention after the end of the 
cold war such as the reluctance to provide protection for civilians in the cases of 
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavian Republics, the Congo DRC…etc on the one hand, 
and the intervention without a prior authorization from the Security Council such as 
the case of Kosovo from the other, has led the international community to seek 
alternative solutions that respect the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention 
from one hand and to allow the timely international response to humanitarian crises 
from the other. This was the idea behind establishing the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that coined the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
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The “Responsibility to Protect” was invented to address certain shortcomings in its 
predecessor “Humanitarian Intervention”. Intervention under humanitarian allegations 
used to be either too selective or too late. R2P tried to set certain rules and regulations 
to govern the process of the use of force. However, the thesis argues that while the 
responsibility to protect has advanced the debate about humanitarian intervention in 
many key respects, the end results was that R2P became subject to some of the same 
pitfalls found in “humanitarian intervention”. Despite the huge aspiration that 
accompanied R2P and the expectations that future humanitarian interventions will be 
guided according to certain rules and regulations rather than mere political interests, 
the pattern of international interventions after R2P remained problematic.  
The main hypothesis of the thesis is that throughout ages political interests were the 
dominant motive behind the decision of international intervention in humanitarian 
crises. Despite the great aspirations that accompanied the adoption of R2P, the pattern 
of international intervention under humanitarian reasons remained under the effect of 
the dominance of the political interests as it used to be before the adoption of R2P.  
The thesis adopts the realist view in international relations. It argues that this 
selectivity in the international response before and after R2P stems from the nature of 
the international system itself. In the absence of a central authority to implement 
norms such as human rights, state's action is always determined by its interests. 
Although these interests may include interest in human rights, humanitarian aspects, 
alone these interests are rarely sufficient to motivate a state to intervene abroad. For a 
state to conduct forcible intervention in support of human rights, it requires the state 
to expend its resources and to put the lives of its military personnel at risk, something 
a state will not likely do in the absence of self-interest. That is why it was not 
surprising to notice that in many cases, the humanitarian conditions were grave, but 
major powers expressed little interest in intervening in such conditions because major 
powers did not have any political or economic interest to intervene. 
Martha Finnemore argues that the realist thoughts that focus on the political or 
economic interests do not provide enough justifications to the rapidly multiplying 
cases of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War (M. Finnemore, 
Constructive norms of humanitarian intervention n.d.). She argues that most, if not all, 
cases of humanitarian intervention occurred in countries where major powers had no 
national interest to intervene. She contends that none of the realist or liberal 
approaches provide an answer to the question what interests the intervening major 
powers are pursuing. According to her, Realists and most liberals do not investigate 
interests, they assume them (Ibid). 
This thesis will provide answers to these questions through studying different cases of 
intervention under humanitarian causes before and after R2P. The thesis will 
demonstrate that political interests, not the humanitarian motives, were the main 
driving force for deciding international intervention. The thesis will particularly focus 
on two major incidents of humanitarian crises after the adoption of R2P; The NATO-
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led intervention in Libya and the long lasting humanitarian crisis in Syria. Both the 
Libyan and Syrian governments targeted their own civilian populations and 
committed crimes against humanity. According to R2P’s parameters, both 
governments were unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities toward their own 
citizens. Despite the fact that “just cause” exists in both cases, the UN Security 
Council authorized military intervention against Libya, while remained reluctant to do 
the same with regard to the Syrian crisis. 
The contrast between the international response to the two cases demonstrates this 
thesis argument that “R2P” is subject to many of the same pitfalls found in the 
principle of “humanitarian intervention”. This discrepancy between the international 
response in the two cases illustrates the thesis hypothesis that states intervene in 
instances where they have an interests in intervention and the power to do so. This 
selectivity had plagued state actions under the frameworks of both humanitarian 
intervention and the responsibility to protect.  
The thesis views that this discrepancy in the reaction of the international community 
stems, not from the differences in the humanitarian situation in both cases, but from 
differences in the international community's willingness to intervene. This willingness 
stems mainly from considerations like power and interest. As these two cases suggest, 
the international response varied even in circumstances that are quite comparable; 
R2P in both cases did not provide any consistent ground for intervention more than its 
predecessor the “Humanitarian Intervention”.  
This chapter will investigate and discuss cases of international intervention under 
humanitarian claims in different time limits before the adoption of R2P. The term 
"Humanitarian Intervention" has existed in the past centuries since the early rise of 
the notion of sovereign states. However, since then humanitarian intervention has 
been an issue of controversy, there were no rules or regulations to humanitarian 
intervention; states used to act according to their own perceived interests even if they 
claim humanitarian motives. The NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) represented a 
land mark in the history of humanitarian intervention. It led many to view that the 
time was ripe by then for the adoption of a principled framework for humanitarian 
intervention, the framework that was proposed and coined later under the name of 
R2P by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).   
1.2 The Origin of the Concept of “Humanitarian Intervention"  
It is interesting to read in history that the tension between the advocates of sanctity of 
state sovereignty and those calling for intervention to provide assistance beyond 
borders in humanitarian cases is not a new issue in international relations. The term 
“Humanitarian Intervention” had been used frequently in Europe in the past centuries 
parallel to the evolution of the concept of non-intervention in other sovereign states. 
(Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A history of humanitariansim 2011). 
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In fact, the concept of "Humanitarian Intervention" has emerged in the past centuries 
as a possible exception to the principle of non-intervention that has emerged during 
the same era. Hugo Grotius though argued that "war cannot be justified against other 
sovereigns or even against those who erred in the interpretation of Christianity or who 
refused to accept it". He defended the right of the state to wage war for the purpose of 
punishment, not only for injuries committed against the sovereign or his subjects, but 
also against those who "excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to 
any person whatsoever" (Ibid, pp.11). In Grotius’ opinion, the just war waged on 
behalf of the oppressed subjects of another sovereign is a legal right rather than a 
moral duty. (Ibid pp.15) 
Meanwhile, there was no clear meaning for the modalities of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention. While some scholars rejected the whole principle, others 
argued that it is a legal right, while a third group viewed that international law should 
say a little about this matter (Chesterman 2003) Throughout these ages, there was no 
agreed definition for “Humanitarian Intervention”. It was argued that the fundamental 
premise of that notion provides that outside powers may be granted the right to use 
force outside their borders to provide protection for people of another state when this 
state become unable to provide such protection or when the state authorities are the 
source of sufferings (Gieyrcz 2010) 
In his book "Against massacres: Humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire" 
David Rodingo investigated the roots of the phenomenon through examining different 
cases of intervention on humanitarian grounds from European history in the 
nineteenth century. He argued that in general when European states dealt with 
massacres taking place mainly in the Ottoman Empire, they ignored the abuse of 
human rights in their respective colonies. European diplomats in the nineteenth 
century demanded the Ottoman government to legislate for citizenship and equality, 
while in a former Ottoman territory such as Algeria, the French authorities ruled in a 
more despotic and discriminate way than the Ottomans had ever done.  
Rodingo argues that the European states intervened militarily when the "barbaric" 
Ottomans used the same "savage" means to repress rebellions they systemically used 
in their own colonies. The British for instance, while defending the Greek sufferings 
during 1820's, were discussing how to deal with the insurgency in India and how to 
foster Catholic grievances in Ireland. The argument among many scholars of that age 
was that the Ottoman Empire belongs to the uncivilized orient and was not a member 
of the family of nations. (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in 
the Ottoman Empire" 2012) 
The following section will shed light on two milestone cases of international 
intervention under humanitarian allegations. The international intervention in Greece 
(1827), and the international intervention in Mount Lebanon (1860). These cases 
represent two early examples of claimed humanitarian interventions in the nineteenth 
century. The aim of this historical narration is to shed light on the historical evolution 
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of the issue of intervention in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states under 
humanitarian causes from the old ages till the launch of the R2P. The aim of 
discussing these cases of intervention is to demonstrate that the term “Humanitarian 
Intervention” has been frequently used in the past centuries as well as is being used 
nowadays. More importantly, the political factors and the international rivalry have 
been the dominant motives that stood behind the decision of intervention.  
1.2.1 The International Intervention in Navarino 1827 
The joint intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia in aid of the Greek 
insurgents against the Ottoman rule in 1827 is frequently considered as the earliest 
example of a claimed humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2003). Rodingo 
describes the international intervention as a "coup d' assai" of state practices that 
would crystallize through that century (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian 
intervention in the Ottoman Empire" 2012) However, he questions whether the 1827 
intervention was a genuine "humanitarian intervention" against the ethnic cleansing 
and other atrocities committed by the Ottomans against civilians in Greece.  
Following news that widespread massacres are taking place in Greece by the Turks, 
Great Britain, France and Russia threatened to use force against the sovereignty of 
Ottoman Empire under humanitarian allegations. Russia took the first step and 
threatened the use force. In fact, the main factor that forced the British and the French 
intervention at Navarino in October 1827 was the fears from the Russian threat of a 
unilateral intervention against the Porte (M. Finnemore 1998). Although the 
justifications that Russia offered was humanitarian, part of the Russian motivations 
were geostrategic (Ibid). Russia was pursuing a general strategy of consolidating 
control in the Balkans and weakening the Ottomans. Britain and France opposed the 
Russian intervention largely because they were concerned that weakening the 
Ottoman Empire would be in the advantage of Russia (Ibid).  
Rodingo illustrates that international relations rivalry at that era played an important 
role in prompting the Western states intervention in Greece. The possible Russian 
intervention if were happened would have been resulted in establishing a Russian 
satellite Greek state. This was the main motive behind the British intervention in 
Greece (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman 
Empire" 2012). Also, the Egyptian occupation of Morea was able to create a new 
power that could threaten the British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and its 
trade with India (Ibid).  
We can conclude from the above that it was political factors and the international 
rivalry, not the humanitarian concerns that motivated the intervention in Greece 1827. 
Moreover, the treaty that was signed in London in July 1827 by the intervening 
powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) to coordinate the intervention sets forth 
clearly in its preamble the grounds on which major powers made their decision for 
intervention in Greek. The primary goal of intervention according to the treaty was to 
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fix "all the disorders and anarchy caused by the struggle which impeded the 
commerce of the states of Europe and gave opportunity to pirates" (Chesterman 
2003). (pp 29) In that regard, it was not unexpected to learn that the modalities of 
intervention at Navarino did not eventually bring the relief to Greek civilian 
populations after intervention. Instead, it merely emphasized the interests of the 
intervening powers (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in the 
Ottoman Empire" 2012) 
1.2.2 The International Intervention in Mount Lebanon 1860 
In 1860 another international intervention in the name of humanitarian motives took 
place this time in Mount Lebanon which was also under the Ottomans sovereignty. 
The allegations this time was to put an end to the sectarian massacres between the 
Druze and the Maronites. Rodingo points out that the scholars of that age viewed the 
massacre as a consequence of native tribalism and barbarism of the Turkish role, 
hence, they viewed that European governments were not bound by the principles of 
non-intervention in their political behavior with the Ottoman Empire. (Rodogno, 
against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire" 2012)  
It is noteworthy that as early as 1250, Louis IX of France signed a treaty with the 
Maronite Christians of the Levant guaranteeing their protection as if they were French 
subjects, and in effect the treaty made them part of the French empire. Napoleon III 
thus was eager to support military intervention in part at least to placate outraged 
catholic opinion at home (M. Finnemore 1998).  Therefore, the French in particular 
described events in Lebanon as the "indiscriminate and brutal slaying of Christians at 
the hands of the Muslim Druze" ( (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian 
intervention in the Ottoman Empire" 2012) pp 97).  They put forward the idea that the 
regeneration and the reconnection of the local population with civilization would 
provide moral grounds for intervention (M. Finnemore 1998). Russia was also eager 
to intervene. Therefore Britain became involved in the intervention only to prevent 
Russia and France from using the incidences to expand territorially (Ibid). 
In the operational side, the intervening states claimed that the Ottoman Empire was 
responsible and unable/ unwilling to put an end to the massacres. Therefore, the 
civilized nations should intervene to halt the atrocities. On the 31
st
 of July 1860, a 
conference was convened in Paris, which was attended by representatives from 
Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The major 
powers managed to get the consent of the Ottoman Empire to receive up to 12,000 
troops to the Syrian coast to contribute to establishing stability and tranquility. France 
offered to deploy half the number of troops immediately. Although the mission was 
designed at the beginning to remain for 6 months in Syria, it was extended to almost 
one year till June 1861. However, when the French troops reached their destination, 
they found that order and law had been restored by the Ottoman authorities 
(Chesterman 2003). According to eyewitnesses, Western fleets started by evacuating 
Western residences at the beginning while only a minority of refugees were saved. 
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(Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire" 
2012)  
Although it could be argued that the consent of the Ottoman Empire from one side, 
and the limited mandate of intervening forces (6 months) from the other, would not 
allow historians to describe it as a classical humanitarian intervention, but it is 
important to keep into consideration that the Porte gave his consent in order to avoid 
worse outcomes (Chesterman 2003). We can infer from the case of intervention in 
Mount Lebanon that the political factors were also the main drive for intervention. 
The rivalry between the three major powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) was 
decisive in shaping the pattern of intervention. Moreover, during military 
intervention, major powers were keen primarily on securing its interests before 
looking after the refugees. 
The aim of this historical narration is to shed light on the historical evolution of the 
issue of intervention in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states under 
humanitarian causes. The term “Humanitarian Intervention” has been frequently used 
in the past centuries as well as is being used nowadays. However, throughout these 
ages, there were no clear meaning for the modalities of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention; the international relations rivalry and economic interests played the 
important role in prompting major powers for intervention, that was very clear in the 
case of intervention in Greece (1827) when the intervening powers stated that the aim 
of intervention is to " fix all the disorders and anarchy caused by the struggle which 
impeded the commerce of the states of Europe".  
In fact, from the nineteenth century till the end of the twentieth century, the cases of 
intervention in the affairs of other states under humanitarian causes have never ceased 
to recur. Rodingo argues that governments throughout history used to act according to 
their own perceived interests, even if they claimed other purposes. According to him 
what can really distinguish “Humanitarian Intervention” from other kinds of 
interventions is when state agents see saving the lives of strangers as an act of "moral 
obligation", which was not necessarily the case in the previous interventions under 
humanitarian claims (Rodogno, against massacre: Humanitarian intervention in the 
Ottoman Empire" 2012). 
Therefore, the concept “Humanitarian Intervention” remained "undefined" throughout 
these ages. The case of Kosovo (1999) when NATO used force against the Former 
Yugoslavian Republic claiming humanitarian reasons without a mandate from the UN 
Security Council was a land mark in the history of humanitarian intervention. It made 
it clear that time was ripe by then for the adoption of a principled framework for 
humanitarian intervention. This framework then was proposed and coined later by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and named 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The following section will discuss in more details 
the NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.  
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1.2.3 The Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo 
1.2.3.1 Introduction 
The advocates of R2P and Humanitarian Intervention argue that NATO’s intervention 
in Kosovo represented a seminal event in international relations. Despite the long 
lasting devastating civil war in Kosovo, the traditional international mechanisms at 
that time were not able to make an end to the civilian sufferings in that province. 
According to this camp, the NATO’s intervention in Kosovo without a mandate from 
the Security Council demonstrated the need to establish a principled framework that 
governs humanitarian intervention. 
The advocates of R2P argue that the debate over the legality and the legitimacy of the 
use of force in the case of Kosovo had made it clear that that time was ripe by then for 
the adoption of a principled framework for humanitarian intervention that can provide 
better protection for those who need it through assuring the primacy of the moral 
considerations over any other political interests. In a response to these calls, the 
Government of Canada in a collaboration with a group of major foundations 
announced at the General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which 
coined the doctrine of R2P.  
1.2.3.2 Roots of the Crisis 
Kosovo holds special significance for many Albanians and Serbs. For Albanians it is 
the home of their national movement. For Serbs, their defeat in front of the Turkish 
army at the battle of Kosovo in 1389 marked the end of an era that many nationalists 
consider to be the “Serbia the Great” (Seybolt 2007). In the modern history, Kosovo 
used to be with its Albanian majority an autonomous province in the Yugoslav 
federation since the establishment of the federation in 1918, however, a lot of factors 
have contributed to the conflict in the province and the eventual dissolution of the 
whole Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  
Many argue that the 1988 constitutional reforms presented by Slobodan Milosevic, 
the former Yugoslavian president, marked the point of no return; those reforms have 
concentrated powers in the central capital city of Belgrade. Moreover, in 1990, 
Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitutional status of the province and abolished its 
autonomous status and its autonomous institutions; since then, the province started to 
be ruled centrally from Belgrade. (Barnett, Empire of humanity 2011) 
As a result to the latest constitutional developments, nationalist sentiments and 
separatist movements started to grow rapidly among the people of Yugoslavia. 
Slovenia and Croatia took the lead declaring their own independence in 1991. In April 
1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed them and also proclaimed its independence. 
However, in the Bosnian case, clashes soon broke out between its three principal 
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communities; Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats, which led to the death of tens of 
thousands and the displacement of nearly 2.6 million Bosnians. 
 In Kosovo, the Albanian majority shared the same feelings of marginalization and 
suppression by the central government of Former Republic of Yugoslavia. However 
the goal of independence for the Kosovars at that time was far from reach. The 
signing of the "Dayton peace" agreement in November 1995, which ended the 
Bosnian war, constituted a huge trauma for Kosovo’s Albanians. Dayton peace talked 
mainly about Bosnia and Kosovo's problem was not an issue of discussion during the 
negotiations. This meant for many of the Kosovo Albanians that the option of the 
peaceful resistance would get to nowhere. From that moment on, the tide began to 
turn in the favor of violent resistance (Judah 2008). 
1.2.3.3 The Launch of the Armed Conflict in Kosovo 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was initially founded in 1993. However, it was 
only in 1996 that perhaps just 150 men began to take action and launch attacks against 
the Serbian troops (Judah 2008). In April 1996, the KLA carried out a series of 
attacks against the Yugoslav Army. The central government reprisal came instantly 
through higher levels of indiscriminate violence against those who were suspected of 
being loyal to KLA and also against the ordinary Albanian civilians, which led 
eventually to the death and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals 
from their villages (Barnett, Empire of humanity 2011) 
This had made the decision among the militants inclined towards a much armed 
resistance. However, the full-scale uprising against the Serbian government needed an 
access to arms. In the spring of 1997, the most unexpected thing took place; the 
neighboring country of Albania collapsed into a complete anarchy. In the chaos that 
followed, the government lost its control; this had provided conducive environment 
for the Kosovar militants to find a source of armament. (Judah 2008) 
The KLA since then began to take territories in the central region and in the west of 
Kosovo. More and more young people began to trek over the mountains to Albania to 
collect weapons. Kosovo Albanians were overtaken by mixed conflicting feelings. 
Fear was one of them, but euphoria was stronger. However, despite the 
aforementioned feelings, the KLA itself was not prepared for what was already 
happening, it did not really manage to exercise full control over the situation on the 
ground; many villages were arming themselves, and with little link to the KLA, 
calling themselves KLA. 
1.2.3.4The Engagement of the International Community  
The international community started by that time to take note of the devastating 
situation in Kosovo. The first UN Security Council response to the situation in 
Kosovo came in March 1998 (UNSC Resolution 1160) under chapter VII imposing 
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arms embargo on both the Serbian government and the KLA and calling parties to 
negotiate a political settlement. 
However, both parties did not respond seriously to the UNSC resolution demands to 
stop violence. As a result of the continued conflict, many non-Albanian ethnic 
minorities from areas controlled by the KLA fled or were ethnically cleansed, others 
were murdered (Judah 2008). The Serbian troops in return started to dig fortifications 
while maintained its crackdown over the KLA-controlled areas. Villages began to be 
burnt and tens of thousands of civilians fled their homes. By August 3 1998, the 
UNHCR estimated that 200,000 Kosovars had been displaced. 
It is worth noting that although the Yugoslavian Army committed grave international 
crimes against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, The Kosovo Liberation Army also 
committed terrorist and other grave violations of the international laws of war against 
the Serbs and the FRY forces. Both the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo 
were engaged in brutal crimes against each other. (Charney 1999) However, the 
NATO action was only directed against the Serbian troops while the KLA leaders 
became the officials of the new state.  
Another resolution (UNSC Resolution 1199) was adopted by the UNSC in September 
1998. This resolution expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by the 
Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a ceasefire by both 
parties to the conflict (UN, securitycouncilreport.org 1998). The resolution had also 
considered the situation in Kosovo for the first time as a threat to the international 
peace and security. However, the resolution did not passed easily due to the harsh 
opposition from Russia which, while voted eventually for the resolution, its 
representative at the Security Council stated clearly that Russia would oppose any 
authorization of the use of force in Kosovo by the UNSC.  
Western states therefore were convinced that the Security Council will not be highly 
effective in handling the devastating situation in Kosovo (Barnett, Empire of 
humanity 2011). They started shifting their attention towards NATO due to the 
Russian harsh opposition in the Security Council. In the next month, October 1998, 
Javier Solana, the Secretary General of NATO, stated clearly that Belgrade may face 
a potential military action if it does not comply with the international demands (Ibid) 
The diplomatic initiatives however were more intensified to avoid the military option. 
In the same month, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) was 
established, which was later superseded by the "Kosovo Verification Mission" 
(KVM). The mission comprised of some of 2,000 monitors under the auspices of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The mission acted 
within the framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, in 
order to verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council 
Resolution, as well as to verify the maintenance of the ceasefire by all elements and to 
investigate reports of ceasefire violations (Judah 2008) 
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Towards the end of the year, it was clear that the aforementioned political settlement 
could not hold; the number of clashes between the FRY troops and KLA began to 
multiply. On the 14
th
 of December six Serbian teenagers in the city of Peja were shot 
down. The Serbs retaliated through offensive attacks against the KLA-held village of 
Racak where 45 people were found dead by a trench. It appeared that they had been 
executed by the Serbians after the later took the village (Judah 2008) 
In the wake of Racak massacre, the diplomatic efforts began another attempt through 
organizing a meeting between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians in the town of 
Rambouillet near Paris. The facilitators proposed a draft solution that implied that 
Kosovo would be an autonomous part of Serbia and that some Serbian forces will be 
able to stay in Kosovo, especially along the borders, but security inside the province 
would be guaranteed by NATO-led forces, on the same time, the KLA would have to 
disarm.  
Some of the provisions of the proposed solution was difficult for any Yugoslav leader 
to accept, especially those that imply that security in the province will be maintained 
by NATO forces.  Henry A. Kissinger described the provisions of Rambouillet 
agreement as were drafted entirely in foreign chancelleries and then were imposed on 
both parties of the conflict by the threat of air bombardment (Buckley 2000). As 
expected, Milosevic rejected the plan. He refused NATO deployment in Kosovo. The 
Kosovo Albanians on the other side, albeit objected at the beginning to the provisions 
because the proposed solution did not offer them their goal of "independence", they 
signed the plan after making sure that the Serbian delegation will not sign the 
proposed agreement (Judah 2008). The Serbs proposed an entirely new proposal, but 
it was already too late.  
Upon the failure of Rambouillet talks, the fighting and massacres renewed again. By 
the end of March, Some 2,000 victims had already died since the beginning of the 
conflict, tens of thousands of Albanians were deported by train to Macedonia. Many 
others fled later.. (Judah 2008). 
1.2.3.5 The launch of the Military Operations 
The UNHCR reported few days earlier to the military campaign that there were 
already some 250,000 displaced persons within Kosovo due to the fighting. The 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was pulled out. At the same time it was reported 
that more Serbian forces were heading then towards Kosovo. Subsequently, NATO 
began to launch its airstrike citing the principle of “Humanitarian Intervention” as the 
justification for the use of force (Barnett, Empire of humanity 2011). 
Both NATO and Belgrade after a short while from the beginning of the campaign 
realized that they were miscalculating the endurance of each other. NATO thought 
that the conflict will be short lived, such as what had happened few years ago in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina when NATO propelled the Serbs to Dayton agreement 1995. 
From the other side, Milosevic also thought he could take the risk and he would get a 
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serious assistance and support, including perhaps military help from Russia, the thing 
that has never happened (Judah 2008) 
Subsequently, the bombing lasted for the next 78 days, military targets as well as 
factories and other civilian targets that were perceived as having a dual use in Serbia 
and in Kosovo were destroyed. Other places were targeted in Montenegro as well 
(Judah 2008). Milosevic retaliated in return to NATO's bombardment through 
unleashing a torrent of ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanians (Barnett, Empire 
of humanity 2011).  
Within two weeks of bombardment, over half a million of Kosovars had to leave their 
homes and crossed the borders into Albania, leading to the largest refugee exodus in 
Europe since the Second World War (Barnett, Empire of humanity 2011). NATO's 
decision to fight through launching airstrikes and to avoid ground troops was widely 
criticized for making it easier for Milosevic to execute his atrocities. In fact, while the 
war in Kosovo inflicted considerable damage on Serbia’s infrastructure, it could not 
prevent ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanians. Quite the contrary, it caused 
also considerable collateral damage to ethnic Albanians (Aguera 2001). 
The humanitarian outcome of the NATO bombing was negative. NATO airstrikes did 
not save any lives and caused between 600- 5000 Serbian military deaths, 400-6000 
Serbian civilian deaths as well as unknown numbers of deaths among the Kosovar 
Albanian civilians (Seybolt 2007). Moreover, “Operation Allied Forces” had 
indirectly inflicted causalities upon civilians because it provoked Serbian attacks on 
ethnic Albanians. The report of the Independent International Commission to Identify 
the lessons learned from intervention in Kosovo
1
 stated that "the pattern of the 
logistical arrangements made for the deportations by the Yugoslav army, paramilitary 
groups and the police show that this huge expulsion of Kosovo-Albanians was 
systematic and deliberately organized". According to the report, the NATO air 
campaign did not provoke the attacks on the civilian Kosovar population, but the 
bombing created an environment that made such an operation feasible". (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo : Conflict, International Response, Lessons 
Learned. 2000) 
The report of the International Commission stated as well that during the period of the 
military operations from March 24 to June 19, 1999, the estimated number of killings 
in the province was 10,000, the vast majority of the victims were Kosovar Albanians 
killed by the FRY forces. However, in the first phase of conflict before the 
intervention from February 1998 till March 1999, the report stated that the causalities 
were relatively low, The estimate numbers of the deaths during that period soared 
                                                           
1
 The Independent Commission was funded by the government of Sweden but its members were 
selected by the chairman of the commission judge Richard Goldstone (South Africa) and the Co-chair 
Mr. Carl Tham (Sweden). The commission itself decided its mandate.  The law school of New York 
University, the Ford Foundation, the Open society fund and the Canadian government provided 
assistance to the commission. See the briefing of Judge Goldstone before the United Nations 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20001023.kosovobrfg.doc.html 
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around 1000, and around 400,000 were forced to leave their homes, most of which 
were internally displaced (Independent International Commission on Kosovo : 
Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. 2000). 
 By the end of the bombardment, the UNHCR reported that about 1.45 million 
Kosovo Albanians were forced to leave their homes, including 848,100 Albanians 
who had fled the province. The other hundreds of thousands were displaced within 
Kosovo. The sum of 444,600 was in Albania, 244,500 in Macedonia, 69,000 in 
Montenegro, and 91,057 in other countries (Judah 2008). The NATO campaign had 
inflicted causalities on civilians on both sides of the conflict.  
The report of the Independent Commission on Kosovo stated that despite the fact that 
NATO made "substantial effort" to avoid civilian casualties, there were some serious 
mistakes, as around 500 civilians were killed due to the Western bombardment. The 
Commission also condemned the use of cluster bombs in the war, and the 
environmental damage caused by the use of depleted-uranium and by toxic leaks 
caused by the bombing of industrial and petroleum complexes in several cities. 
However, its report stated that it accepts the view of the final report of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that "there is no 
basis in the available evidence for charging specific individuals with criminal 
violations of the Laws of the War during the NATO campaign". 
The commission concludes that the NATO intervention in Kosovo failed to achieve 
its vowed aim of preventing the massive ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the Serbian 
people were the main losers; for them Kosovo was lost, many Serbs fled or were 
expelled from the province. Serbia suffered considerable economic losses and 
destruction of civilian infrastructure and the overall level of repression in Serbia have 
increased (Independent International Commission on Kosovo : Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned. 2000) 
1.2.3.6The Diplomatic Efforts and the End of Hostilities 
A shift in the Russian initial stance of being an ally to Belgrade was mandatory to 
convince Milosevic to accept the NATO's demands to stop the airstrikes. It could be 
argued that Moscow deserted its traditional role as being a supporter to Belgrade 
because Yeltsin perceived Milosevic as cast from the same mold as the Russian 
communists which Yeltsin had previously confronted at home. (Yesson 1999).  
On 12 May 1999, during the military operations, Moscow agreed to send 
Chernomyrdin, a former Russian prime minister, to Belgrade alongside with Marti 
Ahetessari, the former Finnish president as a representative of the Western countries, 
with a mission to deliver an ultimatum to Belgrade (Yesson 1999) The Russian 
engagement alongside the Western ultimatum has made Milosevic realize that Russia 
would not give up its ties with the West in order to save him. Moreover, Yesson adds 
that Russia even gave Milosevic an ultimatum that unless he accepted the deal, Russia 
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would deliver NATO a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII allowing 
ground invasion of Kosovo. (Yesson 1999).  
On 3 June 1999 the same delegation headed by Victor Chernomyrdin and Martti 
Ahtisaari visited Belgrade again. By now Milosevic was presented with a fait 
accompli. Milosevic understood that Russia was in a no more position to help. He 
finally accepted the paper presented by the visiting delegation on 3 June, and the 
bombardment was ended on June 10, 1999 (Judah 2008) 
On June 10, the Security Council adopted resolution number 1244 welcoming the 
acceptance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles of the peaceful 
settlement in Kosovo, the acceptance of an immediate end to violence, and a rapid 
withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. The resolution authorized 
under Chapter VII the dispatch of an international civil and security presence in 
Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. The resolution passed by 14 votes in favor to 
none against and one abstention (China). (Council 1999) 
On the same day, June 10,  a letter from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization was transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary General 
of the UN, indicated that the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had begun its withdrawal from Kosovo in accordance with procedures agreed to the 
day before. As such, NATO air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had been suspended. 
1.2.3.7 The Role of Political Interests in Deciding Intervention in Kosovo 
In his book ”The new Military humanism: Lessons from Kosovo”, Noam Chomsky 
described the NATO war on Yugoslavia as another rampage in the name of virtue by 
a rogue super power and its junior partners (Chomsky, The new military humanism : 
lessons from Kosovo. 1999). In fact, contrary to the official and mainstream media 
version, there are many factors that are capable of undermining the lofty proclamation 
of the pure humanitarian motives for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. 
Chomsky views that NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo was obligatory for two 
reasons; the first was the humanitarian considerations to stop ethnic cleansing; the 
second element was of equal importance as the first which is to establish the 
credibility of NATO as a global power (Chomsky, The new military humanism : 
lessons from Kosovo. 1999). Chomsky argues that the main benefit for the NATO 
intervention was to keep Europe under control (Ibid). The U.S. planners were 
ambivalent about the decision of the European Union to move towards a unified 
defense policy that will enable it to act independently of the United States (Ibid, PP 
139). In this regard, General Wesley K. Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander of 
NATO in Europe, viewed the NATO air campaign has created a new legacy that will 
extend beyond the borders of Kosovo as it validates NATO’s strength as an alliance 
and attests to its enduring properties (Buckley 2000) pp.253). Also, the US Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen at a private meeting of NATO defense ministers in 
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October 1998 stated that if NATO could not muster a threat to Milosevic what the 
point of the alliance was. 
In the same context, the US National Security Advisor Samuel Berger listed among 
the principal purposes of bombing is to demonstrate that “NATO is a serious power” 
(Chomsky, The new military humanism : lessons from Kosovo. 1999), pp 134). The 
Director of the Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State Morton H. Halperin 
outlines the rational for NATO’s action in Kosovo by stating that the Balkan region is 
“{t}he critical missing peace in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free” (Buckley 
2000) pp 224). According to him, the vision of a united and democratic Europe is 
critical to the U.S. security and this cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent 
remains racked by conflict. He further states that the instability in the Balkans directly 
affects the security of our Greek and Turkish allies in the south as well as our new 
NATO allies Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. By acting with unity and 
resolve, NATO reaffirmed its standing as an effective defender of stability and 
freedom in Europe (Ibid, pp 231).  
Therefore, we can argue that the intervention in Kosovo was merely a test of NATO’s 
credibility and aimed at emphasizing the U.S. international leadership. Basically, 
there were many factors at the Western politicians back mind to justify considering 
the situation in Kosovo as a threat to the international peace and security. The conflict 
in the former Yugoslavian republics was always threatening to expand beyond the 
borders either through making a refugee crisis in the neighboring countries or through 
inviting possible intervention from regional countries such as Turkey, Greece, Italy or 
any other European countries in the conflict (Bardos 2005). Also, one of the perceived 
reasons for the NATO’s intervention was the concern that Yugoslavia carries the virus 
of independence from the U.S hegemony and that the perceived danger that “the 
rotten apple may spoil the barrel” ( (Chomsky, The new military humanism : lessons 
from Kosovo. 1999), Ibid pp 136). Serbia was an annoyance in the Balkans, 
unwelcome impediment to Washington efforts to complete its substantial take over 
Europe. (Ibid pp 137)  
In fact, there are a lot of evidences that NATO bombardment was not undertaken 
directly in response to ethnic cleansing and other Serb atrocities in Kosovo as NATO 
alleged. NATO bombing itself has resulted in accelerating slaughter and 
dispossession of the Albanian Kosovars. NATO military commanders not only took 
these consequences to be entirely predictable, but also informed the press that the 
political leadership had no intent to block the Serb ethnic cleansing and that the 
NATO fighter jets were not designed to have such effect (Chomsky, The new military 
humanism : lessons from Kosovo. 1999) On March 27, U.S.-NATO Commanding 
General Wesley Clark announced that it was “entirely predictable” that Serb terror 
and violence would intensify after the bombing.  He reported that he was not 
surprised by the sharp escalation of Serb terror after the bombing: “The military 
authorities fully anticipated the vicious approach that Milosevic would adopt, as well 
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as the terrible efficiency with which he would carry it out.” (Chomsky, The new 
military humanism : lessons from Kosovo. 1999) 
Although Henry A. Kissinger pleaded that the rational of the intervention in Kosovo 
was that the cohesion of NATO was staked on the unsustainable Rambouillet 
agreement (Henry A. Kissinger, doing injury to history, Newsweek, April 5, 1999). 
However, it can be argued that when the “Racak massacre”, that led to the 
Rambouillet conference, occurred, at the same time, the world leaders did not react to 
similar or worse massacres. While in Kosovo, Western sources estimated that 2000 
killed on both sides in the year prior to bombing and perhaps 200,000-300,000 
internal refugees, the US State Department released its report for Colombia during the 
same year; the figures were eerily similar  as the report stated that around 2000-3000 
persons were killed and around 300,000 new refugees. (Chomsky, The new military 
humanism : lessons from Kosovo. 1999) 
Moreover, the US ambassador William Walker, while leading the OSCE Crime 
Verification Team to Racak, stated that “from what I saw, I don’t hesitate to describe 
the crime as a massacre and a crime against humanity and I don’t hesitate to accuse 
the government security forces of responsibility (Chomsky, The new military 
humanism : lessons from Kosovo. 1999) pp.41). Naom Choamsy reveal that the same 
person served as the US ambassador to El-Salvador where he administered the US 
support that allowed the Salvadorian government to carry out extreme state terror acts 
that included the murder of leading Salvadorian dissident intellectuals, Jesuit priests 
along with their families in 1989. (Ibid) 
During the same decade of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the 1990’s, the Turkish 
repression of Kurds has been a major scandal (Chomsky, The new military humanism 
: lessons from Kosovo. 1999) The savage atrocities committed by the Turkish 
government were rapidly increased reaching its peaking during 1994- 1996. The toll 
of internally displaced persons (IDP’s) has increased substantially up to 2.5 or 3 
million along with unknown numbers who have fled the country. This has continued 
along with the torture, destruction of some 3500 villages which are seven times higher 
than those in Kosovo. Moreover, some Kurdish villages were bombarded with napalm 
and the causalities generally estimated in the tens of thousands (Ibid). However, this 
brutal crackdown on civilians concurred with a continued support from Washington to 
the Turkish leadership. Washington claimed to be unable to investigate atrocities in 
southeast Turkey because of Turkish bans on travel to the region. At the 1993 
American Academy Conference on Emerging Norms, Ernest Haas raised a simple and 
cogent question. He observed that NATO was during that time was intervening in Iraq 
and Bosnia to protect Kurds and Muslims. He questioned that “will NATO may take 
the same interventionist view in Turkey as it leans heavily on its Kurdish insurgents?”  
From another context, the humanitarian situation in Kosovo, despite the insistence of 
NATO leaders that humanitarian reasons were the main motives for intervention, did 
not witness improvement after the end of the military operations. After the end of the 
21 
 
bombardment and despite the dispatch of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and 
the myriad other organizations and states trying to bring peace, stability, human rights 
to Kosovo. All the above missions have utterly failed in their efforts. According to the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Kosovo remained a lawless place in 
which the only true authority remained with the former KLA and underworld bosses. 
(Bardos 2005) Despite the presence of 40,000 armed soldiers after the summer of 
1999, Kosovo was characterized by a high level of crime and violence. The inability 
to stop new wave of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo represented a major failure for the 
international community. According to the Independent Commission, more than half 
of the Serb population left the province or were later forced to leave. The remaining 
Serb population is living in enclaves or in divided cities.  
Amnesty International reported in April 2003 that the non-Albanian ethnic 
communities in Kosovo have suffered from tragic and catastrophic incidents. The end 
result was far from becoming a tolerant society where different ethnic groups can 
achieve their human and civil rights, it remained a society of injustice.  
More importantly, despite the fact that successive UNSC resolutions during the crisis 
had reaffirmed the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), on January 26, 2007, eight years after the NATO intervention, the 
then UN Special envoy Marti Ahtissari presented a proposal for Kosovo 
independence (Elise 2011). Moreover on June 10, 2007, the US President George W. 
Bush, on a visit to Albania, declared that Kosovo should be an independent country. 
(Ibid) Therefore on 17 February 2008, the parliament of Kosovo declared the 
country’s independence. The following day the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Albania, Turkey and many other Western countries recognized the new 
Republic of Kosovo (Elise 2011). By mid-2009, about 60 UN Member States 
recognized Kosovo as an independent country (UN.org 2008) . 
Therefore, we can conclude from the above that political factors were also dominating 
the decision of intervention in Kosovo. While Western leaders expressed deep 
concerns about the atrocities in Kosovo, the same leaders turned the deaf ear 
regarding similar atrocities committed by their ally Turkey. 
 Noam Chomsky views that the new generation of internationalism merely replays old 
and unpleasant record of colonization. This new generation uses the same rhetoric and 
justifications offered by their forebears. (Chomsky, The new military humanism : 
lessons from Kosovo. 1999) (pp 15). This kind of new Interventionism was hailed by 
intellectual opinion who claimed that a new era in world affairs in which the 
“enlightened states” will be able to use force when they “believe it to be just,” 
disregarding the “restrictive old rules” and obeying “modem notions of justice” that 
they fashion. Therefore, the enlightened states can dedicate themselves to the mission 
of upholding human rights and bringing justice and freedom to suffering people 
everywhere, by force if necessary. He warned that there is no threat to the 
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international order than those particular states or group of states that set themselves up 
as the authoritative judges of the world common good in disregard of the views of 
others.(Ibid, pp 156) Therefore, according to Chomsky the right of humanitarian 
intervention is likely to be more frequently used in the coming years, may be with 
justifications or maybe not in light of the collapse of the deterrence system of the 
Cold War. 
1.2.3.8 The Legal Debate on Kosovo. 
The NATO action in Kosovo received fierce criticism as it lacked a firm basis in the 
UN Charter, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter clearly states that “{a}ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The only accepted qualifications 
to the use of force according to the UN charter are found in article 51 where it is 
restricted within the domain of self-defense “Nothing in the present charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations”, or through the coercive measures 
authorized by the UN Security Council (Articles 41,42) This position was reaffirmed 
by the International Court of Justice when decided on the case concerning the Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United 
States) that the United States of America by “certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory 
has acted in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force 
against another state”. (icj-cij.org 1986) 
The Security Council adopted three resolutions under chapter VII of the UN charter 
regarding the case of Kosovo, none of which had authorized the use of force by any 
mean. On the contrary, those resolutions had reaffirmed the sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Due to the fact that the 
Security Council neither authorized NATO's action before it started nor approved 
them subsequently in its resolution 1244, the legality of the NATO intervention 
remains questionable (Charney 1999).  
The Former Republic of Yugoslavia brought the case of the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo before the International Court of Justice on 29 April 1999, accusing the 
NATO states of bombing the Yugoslav territory and alleging a notable violation for 
the obligation not to use force. The same day, it submitted a request for the indication 
of provisional measures asking the Court to order the United States of America to 
cease immediately its acts of use of force and to refrain from any act of threat or use 
of force against the FRY. 
The Court stated in its order on June 2, 1999 that it is deeply concerned with the 
human tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the 
background of the dispute. Regarding the issue of the legality of the use of force, the 
court stated that it is profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia, which 
23 
 
under the present circumstances, raises very serious issues of international law, the 
Court deemed it is necessary to emphasize that all parties before it must act in 
conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of 
international law, including the humanitarian law.  
However, the court eventually dropped the case due to different procedural reasons. 
The case of the use of force in Kosovo presented by Yugoslavia against the United 
States was dropped because the latter did not accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Hence, 
the Court concluded that it does not have a jurisdiction over the dispute because one 
of the fundamental principles of its statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between 
States without the consent of those states to its jurisdiction". (icj-cij.org 1999) pp. 122  
Regarding the other contentious cases, Yugoslavia against (the UK, Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Canada, Belgium) the cases were dropped because 
the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations 
during the period 1992-2000 was “ambiguous and open to different assessments” (icj-
cij.org 1999). Following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) a declaration by the SFRY Assembly in 27 April 1992 claimed the 
continuation of the international legal and political personality of the SFRY by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A note was sent at the same to the United Nations 
Secretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY of the membership of the 
SFRY in the Organization. However, the Security Council resolution 777 of 1992 
considered that the FRY could not continue automatically the SFRY’s membership. 
Moreover, the General Assembly resolution 47/1 in 1992 stated that the FRY shall not 
participate in the work of the General Assembly.  
This situation came to an end after the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic when the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 27 October 2000 requested admission to 
membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly 
resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. Therefore, the Court concluded that at the time 
when NATO intervened in Kosovo, the Applicant, Serbia and Montenegro, was not a 
Member of the United Nations, and consequently, was not, on that basis, a State party 
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
From another context, a committee from the UK House of Commons concluded in 
2000 that NATO’s military action was “of dubious legality in the current state of 
international law". In its analysis of the legal justifications offered by the government 
of the United Kingdom it viewed that although the intervention can be justified on 
moral grounds (publications.parliament.uk 1999) pp. 249), however the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention has "a tenuous basis in the current international customary 
law, and that this renders NATO action legally questionable" (Ibid) (Paragraph 132). 
The report pleaded that the Operation Allied Force was "contrary to the specific terms 
of what might be termed as the basic law of the international community and the UN 
Charter, and this might have been avoided if the Allies had attempted to use the 
Uniting for Peace procedures". (Ibid) (Paragraph 128) The report concluded by 
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supporting the aim of establishing new principles in the United Nations governing 
humanitarian intervention (Paragraph 144) 
In contrast to the UK’s parliament approach, the German Bundestag (Parliament) 
acknowledged clearly that the action was not legal; however, it also justified the 
intervention as a "moral necessity". In this regard the German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer, in his address to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 1999, 
clearly warned against viewing NATO’s intervention as a "first step towards a 
practice of humanitarian intervention outside the UN system. According to him, this 
step can only be justified in this special situation and must not set a precedent for 
weakening the UN Security Council’s monopoly on authorizing the use of force. He 
also viewed that the only solution is to further develop the existing United Nations 
system in such a way that in the future it will be able to intervene in good time in 
cases of very grave human rights violations within a strictly limited legal and 
controlled framework. (Rytter, Humanitarian Intervention without the Security 
Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo and Beyond 2001) 
The legal debate about the NATO intervention in Kosovo arouse torrent debate in the 
academic circles, the advocates of the restrictive interpretation of the UN charter 
Article 2 (4) provide that although the legal system in which the veto power of five 
states is at the center may be out of date, but until the time of mutual restraint and 
good faith, or until the United States and others offer outright reform, this legal 
system is unlikely to change. Accordingly, although we may not like Article 2(4) that 
prevents the use of force outside the Security Council framework, a rule is a rule is a 
rule. (Koh 2013) 
From the other side, the advocates of humanitarian intervention depicts the advocates 
for this restrictive interpretation of article 2 (4) as originalist/ textualist (Koh 2013) 
They viewed that this absolutist position does not acknowledge that the UN has 
multiple purposes including protecting human rights, promoting regional security, and 
ending the scourge of war instead flattening those purposes to a single goal 
“protecting sovereignty”(Ibid).  Koh criticizes the calls for this strict interpretation of 
the provisions of law by stating that "some commentators warn: 
 “let’s not make it easier for policymakers to use force by saying it is legal when it’s 
not… But let’s also not make it easier for people of good will to do nothing by 
pretending that the law is so determinate and immutable in the face of compelling 
moral imperatives, that we must keep treating as illegal what may now be necessary 
to save lives or spur diplomacy to remove chemical weapons”.  (Koh 2013)  
The Independent Commission on Kosovo reached a stark and notable conclusion on 
this regard. It viewed that the NATO intervention in Kosovo as "illegal but 
legitimate". It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United 
Nations Security Council. However, the intervention, according to the commission, 
was justified due to the fact that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and 
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because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule. (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo : Conflict, International Response, Lessons 
Learned. 2000) 
More importantly, the Independent Commission on Kosovo suggests that the 
experience in Kosovo had uncovered the need to close the gap between the legality 
and the legitimacy. The Commission argued that the time was ripe by then for the 
adoption of a principled framework for humanitarian intervention which can be used 
to guide future responses to imminent humanitarian catastrophes. Subsequently, the 
report proposed three threshold principles, which must be satisfied in advance before 
any legitimate claims to humanitarian intervention can be made. These principles 
include: human sufferings due to human rights violations or a breakdown in the 
government, the presence of an overriding commitment to the direct protection of the 
civilian population, and the calculation that the intervention has a reasonable chance 
of success. (Independent International Commission on Kosovo : Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned. 2000) 
The report expressed its wish that the General Assembly of the UN could adopt such a 
framework in some modified form as a declaration and that the UN Charter to be 
adapted to this declaration. The report also advocated for the need to re-consider the 
reformation the main bodies of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, so 
that they can suit the post-Cold War environment. On the meantime, the Commission 
viewed that much more economic resources need to be allocated both to the pre-
conflict and post-conflict measures. The report was then handed over to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations Mr. Kofi Annan. The conclusions of the Independent 
commission on Kosovo had paved the way for the established of the International 
Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in the following year. 
1.3 Conclusion 
This chapter argues that the term "Humanitarian Intervention" has existed in the past 
centuries since the early rise of the notion of sovereign states and non-intervention 
after the Peace of Westphalia. However, humanitarian Intervention has been an issue 
of controversy. Throughout ages there were no clear meaning for the modalities of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention; governments used to act according to their own 
perceived interests even if they claim humanitarian motives. The international 
relations rivalry and economic interests played the dominant role in prompting major 
powers for intervention. Both cases of intervention, non-intervention, or even the 
cases of late/ failed intervention, raised a lot of questions; in most cases there was 
substantial criticism of the way in which military operations were conducted.  
The NATO intervention in Kosovo represented a seminal event in the contemporary 
international relations. It had clearly revealed the presence of a gap and the need to 
further develop the existing rules of the use of force in humanitarian crises at that era 
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of the evolution of the international law. Despite the long lasted devastating situation 
in the province that led to the killing and the deportation of tens of thousands of 
civilians, the traditional international mechanisms remained lagging far behind 
making an end to the civilian sufferings in the province. On another perspective, the 
military intervention in Kosovo had unleashed concerns that the principle of 
humanitarian intervention could be a double edged weapon that could be used as a 
tool by major powers to achieve their interests.  
The aforementioned reasons had motivated the search for new mechanisms that may 
work to provide better protection in the humanitarian cases for those who need it 
through assuring the primacy of the moral considerations over the other political 
interests. In a response to these calls the Government of Canada, together with a 
group of major foundations, announced at the General Assembly in September 2000 
the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) which later coined the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). 
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Chapter Two 
The “Responsibility to Protect” as a Successor to “Humanitarian Intervention” 
We can conclude from the historical review of the first chapter that usually there were 
other motives rather than the sole humanitarian causes that stood behind the decisions 
of intervention under humanitarian allegations. The developments in the 1990s after 
the end of the Cold War have brought the dilemma of HI to the forefront. The 
international community began to undertake wide-ranging action to prevent atrocities 
such as that to protect Kurds in Iraq, the UN operations in Somalia and NATO 
intervention in Kosovo which contributed to the fierce debate regarding the legality 
and legitimacy of HI. By the end of the decade it was widely believed that time was 
ready for the adoption for alternative solutions that respect the principle of 
sovereignty from one side and allow the timely and effectively international response 
to humanitarian crises from the other.  
In an attempt to promote the principle of “Humanitarian Intervention” through 
establishing clearer parameters and conditions for international intervention to 
neutralize political interest, the government of Canada together with a group of major 
foundations announced at the UN General Assembly in 2001 the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the 
commission that coined the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This 
chapter will discuss the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It will also 
shed light on the difference between R2P and its predecessor Humanitarian 
Intervention. The dilemma of R2P and state sovereignty will be discussed and the 
differences between the two versions of R2P, the one that came out in the report of 
ICISS in 2001 and the one that was adopted at the UN World Summit 2005 will be 
highlighted.  
2.1 The International Commission on Intervention and State Security (ICISS) 
According to the ICISS report, the committee was designed to meet three challenges: 
the first one was to promote a comprehensive debate on the issue of “Humanitarian 
Intervention”. The second was to foster new global political consensus on how to 
move forward. The last objective was to find new ways of reconciling the principle of 
sovereignty and intervention (ICISS, International commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty 2001). The commission was co-chaired by Gareth Evans, a former 
minister of foreign of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, a special advisor to the 
United Nations Secretary General, in addition to ten other distinguished members 
from academia and diplomacy. The final report was unanimously adopted by all its 
twelve members in 2001. 
The ICISS defined the responsibility of the host state and the international community 
with regards to humanitarian crises as it is the responsibility of the state to provide 
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protection for its people. However, once a state becomes unable or unwilling to take 
such a responsibility, this responsibility goes in a provisional matter to the 
international community.  From the other hand, in order to safeguard the state 
sovereignty from the opportunistic and selective intervention, ICISS established 
legitimacy criteria for military intervention to determine whether, when and how to 
intervene to ensure that military intervention when it occurs is carried out only for the 
humanitarian purposes with the minimal human costs. (ICISS, International 
commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001) Para: 2.3 
2:2 the Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
The ICISS report identifies three main responsibilities for the international 
community to undertake when a sovereign state becomes unable or unwilling to 
uphold its responsibilities in cases of humanitarian crises: 
1. The responsibility to prevent: through identifying the roots and the causes of 
the conflicts. 
2. The responsibility to react: this is probably the most controversial pillar of 
R2P. This pillar may include, according to the ICISS, in extreme cases, the use 
of coercive measures such as sanctions or military intervention. However, the 
report was keen on stressing that the responsibility to react comes only in 
situations of the compelling need for human protection and in cases when 
preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation. The most 
controversial part in this context is that the ICISS report did not limit the right 
to use coercive measures exclusively to the Security Council. The ICISS 
report referred to other alternative mechanisms to authorize the use of force in 
case of a paralysis of the Security Council due to the absence of unanimity 
among its members. That is the main reason why the report came under fierce 
attacks from several scholars who viewed that this call would destabilize the 
international order and allows the major powers to use force in pursuance of 
their interests outside the umbrella of the UN. This chapter will discuss this 
controversial issue later in more details. 
3. The responsibility to rebuild: through providing the full assistance, 
reconstruction and reconciliation particularly after military intervention. 
2.3 Post intervention Obligations: the Responsibility to Rebuild 
The ICISS introduces a new element to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
which is the responsibility of the international community towards the affected 
regions after military intervention. The report outlines certain obligations in the post 
intervention phase such as peace building in order to ensure that the conditions that 
prompted military intervention will not repeat themselves, as well as to maintain 
security and development for the affected areas. (ICISS, Independant Comission on 
International Security and State Soveregnty 2001) (pp. 39) 
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However, it has be highlighted that although the report stressed out that intervention 
to protect human beings “must not be tainted by any suspicion that is a form of neo-
colonial imperialism” (PP.45), the report refers that the suspension of sovereignty 
after intervention can be de facto for the period of intervention and the follow up but 
not a de jure. (ICISS, The international Comission On intervention and state 
Soveregnty. 2001) (PP. 44)
 2
 Moreover, the report while calling for establishing an 
“effective authority” after military intervention that is capable of providing security 
and stability, it did not exclude the rule of the intervening powers in establishing such 
an authority. Thus, the door is open for claiming that R2P does not call for the 
sovereign state to restore its sovereignty immediately after intervention. Instead, it 
called merely for establishing an "effective authority" that is capable of providing 
security and stability. The thesis believes that addressing a sensitive issue in such a 
simplistic way would intensifies the fears that R2P will also be used as a pretext for 
intervention by major powers as its predecessor the humanitarian intervention did. 
In this context, it is worth noting that the outcome of the UN world summit 2005 that 
endorsed R2P has completely omitted the third pillar. Therefore it was not unexpected 
to perceive that the consequent UNSC resolutions that invoked R2P did not pay 
attention to the post intervention responsibilities. The current situation in Libya post-
intervention is a major example in this regard.  
2.4 The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention: What is New? 
The ICISS report points out that the cause for this shift in terminology form right to 
intervene to the “Responsibility to Protect” are two reasons: the first is that R2P 
acknowledges that the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies within the 
state authority. Only in cases when the state is unable or unwilling to perform this 
responsibility, it becomes the responsibility of the international community. The 
second one is that R2P is not just a responsibility to react, but it has two other pillars 
which are the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild.  Gareth 
Evans, the co-founder of R2P, argues that the new doctrine differs completely from its 
predecessor Humanitarian Intervention (Evans, Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibilty to Protect. 2013) as the former one was much narrower and called 
exclusively for coercive international military actions to stop an ongoing atrocity. On 
the other hand, R2P demands "every appropriate preventive response: be it political, 
diplomatic, legal, economic , or in the security sector (Ibid) 
                                                           
2
 The report in this regard refers to the examples of Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia “This was, for 
example, the objective of the Paris Accords of 1991 on Cambodia, where the device of a "Supreme 
National Council" with representatives of the four competing factions, transferred effective authority 
to the UN to run the country until elections could be held. Similarly, Yugoslavia could be said to have 
temporarily had its sovereignty over Kosovo suspended, though it has not lost it de jure”. See the 
ICISS report p.p 44. The ICISS argue that the overall objective of intervention is not to change 
constitutional arrangements, but to protect them. As the trusteeship system or military intervention 
endeavor to sustain forms of government compatible with the sovereignty of the state in which the 
enforcement has occurred but not undermining that sovereignty. 
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In the view of this thesis, the important added value of R2P that makes the most 
difference between it and its predecessor humanitarian intervention is that while the 
later allows the unilateral use of force under humanitarian claims, R2P, particularly in 
its 2005 version, stresses the importance of the Security Council authorization for 
legitimizing the international response to humanitarian crises. Therefore, R2P does 
not leave the decision for intervention open as its predecessor "Humanitarian 
intervention did. The ICISS report stresses in different occasions that the Security 
Council must be always consulted before any authorization of the use of force in any 
humanitarian crisis “there is no better or more appropriate body than the United 
Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection 
purposes” (pp XII). The report further stresses that “Security Council authorization 
should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried 
out”. 
Furthermore, unlike the “Humanitarian intervention”, the ICISS set six conditions that 
have to be met before to legitimize the decision of intervention. These conditions will 
be discussed in details in the following section. Therefore, R2P was considered to be a 
step forward as it set rules, parameters and conditions before making the decision for 
intervention, in contrary to humanitarian intervention which leaves the decision of 
intervention to be decided according to the wishes or the interests of the international 
powers. Although R2P refers to certain alternatives that maybe considered in case the 
Security Council becomes paralyzed, none of them justifies the unilateral use of force.  
2.5 The ICISS Proposed Alternatives in case of the paralysis of the Security 
Council 
As pointed out during discussing the pillars of the ICISS version of R2P, the second 
pillar of R2P “the responsibility to react”, in the ICISS version, did not limit the 
authority to use coercive measures exclusively to the Security Council. The report 
referred to other alternative mechanisms to authorize the use of force in case of a 
paralysis of the Security Council due to the absence of unanimity among its members. 
The following section will discuss the validity of those proposed alternatives.  
2.5.1 Reforming the Security Council. 
First of all this is not a new mechanism but rather a new call for enhancing the work 
of the primary body that is responsible for maintaining international peace and 
security. The ICISS asserts that the Security Council authorization should in all cases 
sought prior to any military intervention, the Security Council should in turn deal 
promptly with any requests to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss 
of human life or ethnic cleansing.  
To allow this prompt response, the report calls for building a more credible and 
representative Security Council through broadening its membership to make it 
genuinely representative of the world diversity as well as through reforming the 
voting system. Regarding reforming the voting system, the ICISS proposed that the 
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permanent five members of the Security Council should agree on a “code of conduct” 
for not using their veto powers to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing 
military interventions for human protections purposes for which there is otherwise a 
majority support from other members to intervene. 
Although it could be unrealistic to imagine any "major" amendments of the UN 
Charter to take place in the foreseen future in light of the status quo in the 
international relations, there is indeed a need to work towards a more responsible use 
of veto powers. More importantly, although reforming the Security Council is a step 
forward towards containing the probability of the unilateral use of force, it is difficult 
to assume that reforming the UNSC only will prevent international powers from 
sidestepping it.  
2.5.2 The Potential Role of the General Assembly under the Principle of “Uniting 
For Peace”. 
The ICISS report proposes that the principle of “Uniting for Peace” may be invoked 
when the Security Council becomes paralyzed or unable to deal with humanitarian 
situations due to a lack of unanimity among its members. Basically, the principle of 
the Uniting of Peace is based on the UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (1950) 
which states that "{i}n any cases where the Security Council, because of a lack of 
unanimity amongst its five permanent members, fails to act as required to maintain 
international peace and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately and may issue any recommendations it deems necessary in order to 
restore international peace and security". Therefore it is necessary to have had a 
Security Council resolution fail to be adopted, not because of failure to achieve the 
required majority of nine “yes” votes in favor, but rather because at least one 
permanent member cast a veto which prevented the adoption of a resolution (Johnson 
2014)  
In fact, the concept of the “Uniting for peace” has been used in eleven or twelve times 
since the adoption of the UN Charter (www.securitycouncilreports.org). It has been 
used as the basis for operations in Korea (1951), in Egypt (1956), in Congo (1960), as 
well as in other different cases. However, the “Uniting for Peace” has been very 
controversial since its beginning. The idea that the General Assembly substituting 
itself for the UNSC to recommend enforcement action in certain circumstances is 
highly criticized. The International Court of Justice in the “Certain Expenses” 
advisory opinion of 1962 noted that under the Charter, it is the Security Council 
which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance and only the 
Council can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor (p. 163). 
Therefore, it would be of dubious legality when the General Assembly recommended 
the use of coercive force in case of domestic humanitarian crises (Johnson 2014) .  
2.5.3 The Role of Regional Organizations 
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The ICISS proposed invoking the regional organizations in case of the paralysis of the 
Security Council. The advocates of R2P suggests that it is unrealistic to expect that 
the concerned regional states/ organization will rule out their tasks to seek means and 
forms of action to protect their national security and interests in the cases of 
conscience-shocking situations when the Security Council fails to discharge its 
responsibilities (P. Williams 2012).  
In this regard, although article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that 
"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action", article 53 states that "{n}o 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". 
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the same problems that arose within the UN 
system will not reoccur at the regional level. This has recently been evidenced in the 
Arab League’s role in both the Libyan and Syrian cases, where in Libya it maintained 
an active role since the early beginning of the crisis, in Syria the organization has 
been divided (Minerva 2012). On the same context, the Organization of African Unity 
(AU), where many humanitarian crises took place in the last century, suffers from 
massive shortfalls in funding and equipment and had to rely heavily on external 
funding and equipment. For instance, the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) had difficulties in deploying its authorized strength of 8,000 troops, 
largely due to financial and logistical constraints. Similarly, its former mission in 
Darfur, AMIS, faced serious shortfalls in military equipment, resources, and even 
basic supplies before the establishment of its hybrid mission with the UN (UNAMID). 
(Pattison 2015) Therefore the support of the international community represented 
through the UN system is vital in case the regional organizations in the developing 
countries are going to play a future role.  
2.6 The Dilemma of R2P and Sovereignty. 
The ICISS report pointed out that the main theme of discussion was the controversial 
issue of state sovereignty in case of humanitarian crisis. It stressed in several parts of 
the report that the new doctrine is not directed against the old sacred notion of state 
sovereignty. According to the report in a dangerous world marked by overwhelming 
inequalities of power and resources, sovereignty is, for many states, the best, and 
sometimes their only line of defense. For many states and people, sovereignty is also 
recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection for their unique identity and 
even their national freedom. Moreover, it is an affirmation of their right to shape and 
determine their own destiny. (ICISS, The international Comission On intervention and 
state Soveregnty. 2001) (Paragraph 1.32, pp 7)  
The report states that in most cases international peace and security could be served if 
all states abstain from intervening or interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. 
33 
 
(ICISS, The international Comission On intervention and state Soveregnty. 2001) 
(pp.75). In the meantime, the report viewed that there are exceptional circumstances 
in which the very interest of all states requires them to react to cases that genuinely 
shock the conscience of mankind. According to the report, even the strongest 
advocates of states sovereignty don't claim any allegations of unlimited power of a 
state to do whatever it wants to do with its own population (Paragraph 1.35, PP. 8). 
The advocates of R2P were keen on arguing that R2P does not contradict with state 
sovereignty. Francis Deng in his book “Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict 
management in Africa”,  stressed the importance of the doctrine of the "state" and its 
functions, "{a}lthough the state is under pressure from above and below, it will 
continue to be a central factor in national and international affairs". (Deng 1996) PP. 
(Preface xxi) He shared the same view as the ICISS did later that sovereignty, as a 
privilege, entails also responsibilities and that sovereignty stresses the responsibility 
of the state to protect its civilians within its territories. Therefore, states acting 
irresponsibly lose this privilege in a provisional manner and become subject for 
international intervention. The affected state will resume its sovereignty immediately 
after the end of these extraordinary conditions.  
Stevie Martin even argued that state sovereignty and the R2P are codependent and 
that the raison d’être of sovereignty is because of the state responsibility to protect its 
own citizens (Martin, Sovereignty and the Responsibilty to Protect: Mutually 
exclusive or codependant? 2011). Therefore, R2P assists a state in legitimately 
exercising its sovereignty (Ibid).  Moreover, Stevie Martin argues that the notion of 
sovereignty carrying certain responsibilities has been an accepted element of realism 
for at least as long as the norm of non-intervention. In his way to demonstrate his 
view, Martin cites the writings of some of the most ardent advocates of the 
contemporary notion of sovereignty and non-intervention. Specifically, the theories of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, He pleaded that through 
understanding the writings of those founders, we can understand that the notion of 
sovereignty carrying certain responsibilities has been an accepted element of 
sovereignty for at least as long as the norm of non-intervention (Ibid).  
However, the concept of R2P drew negative reactions from many governments in 
Asia and Latin America. They perceived the concept as a legitimization of military 
intervention for strong states against weak ones (Seybolt 2007). In fact, the 
international intervention after the adoption of R2P reveals that international 
intervention was too early in the case of Libya and never happened in many other 
cases including the Syrian case. Moreover, the fears of the developing countries were 
borne out in 2003 when the USA tried to justify its invasion of Iraq in humanitarian 
terms after their initial justification that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass 
destruction turned out to be false (Seybolt 2007). Therefore, the skepticism and 
antagonism of the developing countries could be viewed from the scope that the new 
doctrine will be used as a tool by powerful countries to intervene selectively in the 
affairs of the weak was enhanced. 
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The ICISS in a way to demonstrate its respect to the principle of state sovereignty it 
set certain parameters and conditions that have to be fulfilled before any intervention 
can take place. Those parameters stress the conditionality and the provisional nature 
of any military intervention. These parameters are:  
A. Just cause: in order to have a just cause, there must be a large scale loss of 
life, whether actual or apprehended. Or a large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or 
apprehended.  
B. Right intention: the primary purpose of intervention must be to halt or to 
avert human sufferings. 
C. Last resort: every diplomatic and non- military avenue must have been 
explored before making the decision of intervention. 
D. Proportional means: the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum to secure humanitarian objectives. 
E. Reasonable prospects: military intervention can only be justified if it stands 
on a reasonable chance of success. Also, the military intervention can only be 
justified when the consequences of non-intervention is worse than military 
intervention. 
F. Right authority: This element, as was discussed before, the most 
controversial element of these precautions. The report stressed out that there is 
no better or more appropriate body than the UN Security Council to authorize 
military intervention for human protection purposes, it states clearly that the 
UN Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any 
military intervention. However, The ICISS viewed that if the Security Council 
fails to discharge its responsibilities in addressing conscience shocking crises, 
there should be other alternatives to decide for intervention. This controversy 
was discussed in the previous section. 
It is worth noting that the ICISS criteria for the use of force is merely representing a 
replication of the just war criteria
3
 (Glanville 2012). The ICISS criteria, like the 
                                                           
3
 The Just war criteria provide a framework to evaluate the resort to war as a means of settling 
dispute between groups. Generally, the just war criteria evaluates the use of force by asking whether 
force is justified and , if so, how it maybe carried out. These questions, the whether and the how 
questions, are assessed in light of two sets of moral criteria, the jus ad bellum and the jus in Bello 
respectively.The Jus in bello criteria include the following: 
- Just cause: A just war is occasioned by the need to defend international law, innocent victims 
of aggrerssion, or sovereign territory. 
- Competent authority: the representative (s) of the community must declare war and marshal 
defense. 
- Right interntion: the aim of war should be to reestablish relationships of peace and fairness 
among relevant parties. 
- Last resort: Diplomatic efforts must be reasonably tried and found wanting before 
authorities’ resort to lethal force. 
- Reasonable hope for success: Rash, Futile, or irrational resort to force is prohibited. 
- Relative justice: Neither side in war has monoply on absolute justice in defence of its cause. 
- proportionality: the foreseen risk of war must not outweight the foreseen values. War must 
be worth it, morally speaking, given the stakes and values involved. 
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former just war criteria, are ambiguous and loose as it raises many questions, such as 
what are the threshold of gross abuses for human rights? Although this thesis views 
that these parameters still represent a step forward towards setting criteria and 
conditions to govern the use of force in cases of humanitarian crises, the thesis 
believes also that those criteria still do not live up to the level of clear standards and 
conditions for the international community to mechanize the decisions of international 
intervention and keep it away from political considerations. 
The Russian intervention in Georgia (2008) and the French proposed intervention in 
Myanmar at the same year highlighted the need for improving and clarifying the 
ambiguity about the aforementioned criteria.  In 2008, Georgia launched a military 
operation aimed at restoring the "constitutional order" in South Ossetia. In a prompt 
response by the Russian government, it deployed its military forces and pushed the 
Georgian army outside South Ossetia. Russia claimed that its intervention is justified 
by the principle of R2P as the Georgian army committed mass atrocities during its 
invasion of South Ossetia. However, the Russian unilateral intervention gained little 
support from the international community and its argument that its reaction came in 
line with the R2P received little support at that time. (Bellamy 2010)   
Also, the French proposal for humanitarian intervention in Myanmar after a disastrous 
cyclone struck the country in 2008 represents another example on the absence of a 
clear understanding of R2P. The Government of Myanmar denied the access of the 
international humanitarian agencies to the affected areas. In response to this stance, 
the French foreign minister proposed invoking R2P; however the French proposal 
also received very little support from the international community. The counter 
argument was that R2P cannot be used in the case of natural disasters.  
2.7 The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document.  
The UN World Summit 2005 adopted in its articles 138, 139 a modified version of 
R2P as part of its millennium declaration. These articles are often referred to as the 
"protection clauses". It was agreed by all the 150 participating member states. The 
protection clause explicitly states that each individual state has the responsibility to 
protect its population from atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. The text further spells out the obligation of the 
international community to help states exercise this responsibility, in addition to 
supporting the United Nations in establishing its own warning system. The three 
pillars as was stipulated in the “Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit” 
were:  
                                                                                                                                                                      
From the other side, the “How” question, jus in Bello, focuses on the morality of means: which 
method are permissible in pursuit of a justified action. Therefore not all actions are appropriate in 
pursuit of one’s goals. There are two main criteria enshrines in the Jus in bello: discrimination and 
proportionality... See Richard B. Milller, legitimization, justification, and the politics of rescue pp 384   
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1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states 
in fulfilling this responsibility.  
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect population from these 
crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the 
international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect 
population, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
The protection clauses constitute the first worldwide officially recognized document 
that spells out the concept of R2P which can indicate an increasing awareness of the 
responsibilities of both the host state and the international community towards 
humanitarian crises. However, member states managed to dilute the language offered 
previously by the ICISS.  
Several states during the negotiations of the 2005 World Summit expressed concern 
that the language of the ICISS would facilitate self-interested interference by 
powerful states in the domestic affairs of the weak  (Glanville 2012). Consequently, 
the final agreement expressly tied intervention to the authority of the Security 
Council. Moreover, not only was the scope of intervention restrained, but also the 
notion that such intervention was a collective international responsibility rather than a 
discretionary right was emphasized (Ibid)  
The United States, in particular, was determined to retain its freedom to decide when 
and where to intervene in a response to mass atrocities and humanitarian crises. Thus, 
it sought to reject any suggestion that it might bear a legal obligation to act in a 
particular way when other states failed to protect their populations  (Glanville 2012). 
Therefore, the final outcome of the World Summit document was loose and vague 
especially those provisions regarding the coercive measures comparing to that of the 
ICISS. The outcome document omitted the language of the ICISS related to the use of 
force for protection. Also, the ICISS alternatives on how to react to humanitarian 
situation when the Security Council gets paralyzed by the absence of consensus 
among its members were also dropped. Therefore, the protection clause of the 2005 
millennium declaration de facto rules out any forms of intervention, whether 
collective or individual, without the consent of the UN Security Council (Gieyrcz 
2010) Moreover, the commitment of the international community in the post-conflict 
era was completely dropped as well. 
In the net conclusion, member states were keen on not to offer any specific criteria on 
intervention, therefore the negotiation process at the World Summit on the protection 
clauses ended up that the decision on intervention will be made exclusively by the 
Security Council and on a case by case basis  (Glanville 2012). The thesis views that 
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the absence of any reference to criteria of intervention such as that was presented by 
the ICISS, albeit was general and loose, represented a setback in the process of the 
development of the international response to humanitarian crises. 
The UN General Assembly debated the Secretary-General’s report in July 2009. 
Although it accepted the idea of implementing R2P, there was no agreement on the 
legal obligations of the concept. The conclusion was that every state has a legal 
responsibility to protect its own citizens, but no legally binding obligations to protect 
citizens of other states beyond its borders were adopted (M. Nuruzzaman, The 
“Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013) 
Therefore, the version of the “moral” responsibility to protect, as put in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document, was emphasized. 
From 2001 to 2011, R2P remained dormant; it was not invoked with regard to the 
situations in Darfur, Gaza or Somalia despite evidences of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed by internal and/or external parties. The Security Council 
expressed its support for R2P for the first time in resolution 1674 adopted in April 
2006, which emphasizes the language of articles 138 and 139 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document. However, two permanent members of the Council, China and 
Russia, and three non-permanent members, Algeria, Brazil, and the Philippines, 
expressed reservations.  (M. Nuruzzaman, The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: 
Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013)  
However, from the other side, it is important also not to underestimate the outcomes 
of the 2005 World Summit as the first worldwide officially endorsed document that 
spells out the concept of R2P. This development let the advocates of R2P argues that 
it represents a new norm in the international relations.  
The global endorsement of the 2005 version of R2P has led the aspirations of the 
advocates of the R2P to go very high. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss argued that 
no idea in the international normative arena has moved faster than the R2P. Before the 
launch of R2P, the notion of using military force when a sovereign state acted 
irresponsibly towards its citizens was simply too far from the mainstream of the 
accepted international norms; as the international order was firmly grounded in the 
inviolability of sovereignty. From the other side, states were more attuned to their 
own unique political interests than to humanitarian imperatives. However, according 
to them, since the launch of R2P in 2001, the domestic and international jurisdictions 
are becoming blurring, which became most evident with the willingness and 
sometimes authorized by the United Nations or by regional organizations to shelve 
sacrosanct sovereignty through using military force for human protection purposes. 
According to the advocates R2P the most significant achievement of R2P is to fill the 
"crucial normative gap". (G and Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm-and Action? 2009). 
However, as this thesis will demonstrate the reality on the ground indicates that the 
pattern of humanitarian international intervention after R2P has not changed so much 
and that R2P did very little in this regard.  
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Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue that the international norms have a 
"life cycle"
 
(Finnemore 1998). They identify three stages for norm's life cycle. The 
first stage is the "norm emergence" in which norm entrepreneurs (the ICISS in the 
case of R2P) attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace the new norm. 
The second stage is characterized by what they describe as "norm cascades" through 
the rest of the states. This second stage occurs when the norm reaches a threshold or a 
tipping point after the norm entrepreneurs manage to persuade a critical mass of states 
to adopt it. Finnemore suggests that the norm tipping or critical mass rarely occurs 
before one third of the total states of the system accept it. The norm entered its last 
stage when it becomes widely accepted, making conformity with the norm almost 
automatic. It occurs when the norm acquire the “taking for granted quality” and 
becomes no longer a matter of broad public debate (Ibid) This thesis argues that R2P 
in its 2005 World version which strengthens the prevention over the coercive 
elements has become widely accepted in international relations and that it lies in this 
second stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norms life cycle.  
In conclusion, the thesis views that despite the big aspirations that accompanied the 
launch of R2P, the misuse of the R2P in the case of Libya and the non-use of the 
doctrine in Syria had resulted in a gradual change in the international embracement of 
the norm, from the initial welcoming and the adoption of the doctrine in the 2005 
World summit till the current suspicions that were manifested in the debate over the 
Syrian case at the Security Council.  
2.8 The feedback on R2P 
Since its adoption, R2P has laid a stone in the watershed of the long lasting debate 
regarding the international response to the humanitarian crises. The advocates of R2P 
viewed that it presented a historic challenge to the primacy of sovereignty in 
international relations (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). Fermor argues that the protection 
clauses represent the high watermark of a tide that started with the foundation of the 
UN and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 and 1948 
respectively. According to him, in the protection clauses, heads of states and 
governments signed up commitments that challenge the primacy of sovereignty (Ibid). 
However, from the other side, despite the fact that there is a punch of international 
documents on R2P that speak of the collective responsibility of states to protect 
populations beyond their borders, R2P till this moment does not provide any binding 
legal implications on states (Glanville 2012). From a legal perspective, none of the 
various statement and resolutions on R2P can be treated as generating binding legal 
obligations under the classic sources of international law delineated in article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice; which are international conventions, 
international custom or general principles of law (Ibid). Although some legal scholars 
accept that General Assembly and Security Council resolutions can contribute to the 
interpretation of international law, others continue to insist that such sources at their 
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best merely play a contributory role in the gradual development of customary 
international law (Ibid).  
More importantly, the most claimed authoritative of the documents on R2P, the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document, is merely a restatement of the already existing 
norms and standards for the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter and a watering 
down of the language used previously in the ICISS. Therefore, there is little ground 
for concluding that in the protection clauses, states intended it to establish new legal 
obligations for the protection of populations beyond borders  (Glanville 2012). R2P 
can represent at best a kind of soft law obligation on the UN member states 
In the same context, it was seen that the new doctrine did not provide substantial 
added value to existing rules for intervention. Alan Kuperman, for instance, argued 
that the new doctrine is merely an "old wine in a new bottle". According to him, the 
norm of preventive actions in addition to coercive military intervention emerged 
earlier than the ICISS report, especially in the decade following the end of the Cold 
War when Western countries had the luxury to prioritize humanitarianism. In the 
1990's, the international community did undertake wide-ranging actions to prevent 
atrocities such as that to protect Kurds in Iraq, the UN operations in Somalia and 
Kosovo which were conducted prior to the adoption of R2P. Thus, according to 
Kuperman the formalization of R2P did little more than to apply a new name to this 
international norm. (Kuperman 2011) 
From another context, the advocates of R2P were keen on emphasizing that R2P is in 
the best interest of the developing countries. They argued that people of developing 
countries will primarily benefit if interventions are motivated only by humanitarian 
concerns and that they will suffer the most in case atrocities are committed on a wide 
scale and the international community refuses or fails to provide support or help 
(Thakur, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers. 2013) However, the 
ICISS report itself discriminates between the rich and the poor states. Article 4.42 of 
the report excludes the permanent five members of the Security Council where the 
obligation to intervene would not apply even if all the conditions for intervention 
were met. The great powers are free to treat their citizens in any way they like, but not 
the weaker powers who must comply with the R2P norm to protect (M. Nuruzzaman, 
The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013). 
Therefore, there is a window to argue that R2P mixes up humanitarian causes with 
realpolitik and it merely promotes Western warmongering under a humanitarian 
umbrella (Ibid). 
In fact, the concept of R2P drew negative reactions from many governments in Asia 
and Latin America. They perceived the concept as a legitimization of military 
intervention for strong states against weak ones (Seybolt 2007). The international 
experience after the adoption of R2P reveals that international intervention was too 
early in the case of Libya and never happened in many other cases including the 
Syrian case. The fears of the developing countries were borne out in 2003 when the 
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USA tried to justify its invasion of Iraq in humanitarian terms after their initial 
justification that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction turned out 
to be false. (Seybolt 2007). Therefore, the skepticism and antagonism of the 
developing countries could be viewed from the scope that the new doctrine will be 
used as a tool by powerful countries to intervene selectively in the affairs of the weak 
was enhanced.  
Russia as one of the permanent members of the Security Council although expressed 
acceptance to the first pillar of R2P that ‘sovereignty confers not just rights, but also 
responsibility, Moscow remained adamant that the basis for action should be the 
second pillar of prevention, rather than recourse to coercive intervention under the 
third pillar which must be implemented solely through the Security Council as a last 
resort (Davies 2015). Derek Avere and Lance Davies argue that Russia’s role in the 
Libya and Syria crises reflects an approach rooted in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome document and situated within a statist international legal framework that 
privileges the sovereignty of states. This position does not exclude humanitarian 
considerations, but pleads for the inviolability of national sovereignty’ as the 
fundamental basis of international order (Ibid)  
It is worth noting that it is not only the developing in addition to Russia and China 
that show skepticism regarding R2P, the attitude of the United States regarding R2P 
was also reluctant and lukewarm. We can reveal from the statements of the US 
officials that there are fears that the new doctrine may oblige the U.S to intervene in 
certain domestic crisis that it has no intent to intervene. During drafting the 2005 
outcome document, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, issued a 
communiqué acknowledging that states might have a legal obligation to protect their 
own populations. However, he insisted that the responsibility of the international 
community to protect is merely a “moral responsibility” (Glanville 2012). He firmly 
declared that the U.S. does not accept that either the United Nations as a whole, or the 
Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to intervene under 
international law (Ibid). 
 Therefore, by the end of the negotiations the concluding results with respect to 
invoking Chapter VII enforcement measures was that member states merely declared 
that they were prepared to take collective actions on a case-by-case basis and in 
accordance with UN Charter, so they did not explicitly accept that they had an 
obligation to do so. That is why the thesis argue that the net result of R2P did not 
provide a substantial changes to the current dilemma of how to react in cases of 
humanitarian crises in case of a paralysis of the Security Council. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The dominance of the political interests and the absence of defined rules or 
regulations to govern the international community’s response to humanitarian crises 
have advanced the call for adopting a principled framework for humanitarian 
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intervention; the framework that was proposed and coined in 2001 by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and named 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
Despite the huge aspirations that accompanied the launch of the Responsibility to 
Protect, R2P remained subject to the same pitfalls as the doctrine of “Humanitarian 
Intervention”. The ICISS criteria for the use of force are merely representing a 
replication of the just war criteria which were ambiguous, ineffective and raises many 
questions more than it answers. The ICISS alternatives in case of the paralysis of the 
Security Council were very subjective and controversial; they were later dropped 
down later during discussing the doctrine in the UN 2005 World Summit. This 
chapter views therefore that R2P does not provide substantive added value more than 
the humanitarian intervention did. This chapter argues that in the absence of a central 
authority to implement norms such as human rights, the state actions will be 
dominated by its interests and that pattern of humanitarian intervention will remain 
selective and governed by political considerations. 
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Chapter Three 
The Responsibility to Protect in the Libyan Case 
----------------------------------------- 
3.1 Introduction 
The UN authorized international intervention in Libya represents a stark development 
in the short history of the R2P. UNSC resolution 1973 marks the first time the council 
authorizes the use of force for humanitarian protection purposes against the will of a 
functioning state (Bellamy 2011). However, despite the initial optimism that had 
accompanied invoking R2P for the first time, the developments in Liby during and 
after intervention indicated, in the thesis’ view, that R2P has not succeeded in 
establishing new rules and conditions for intervention to neutralize the dominant role 
of the political interests while deciding intervention in case of humanitarian crisis. 
This chapter argues that political consideration has also played the major role in 
motivating NATO’s intervention in Libya. Humanitarian motives while partly was 
employed in the decision on how to deal with Libya, they represented merely a 
necessary but not a sufficient cause for intervention. This chapter will demonstrate 
that the humanitarian discourse of NATO amounted to no more than justificatory 
propaganda. Interests defined as power was the motivating factor behind the NATO 
operations in Libya, not the humanitarian goals. The NATO insistence on pursuing 
the goal of regime change instead of merely working to protect civilians as enshrined 
by the UNSC resolution, as well as the irresponsible post intervention policies, 
demonstrates that it was the political consideration that mainly motivated the 
international intervention, not the humanitarian ones. Therefore this chapter argues 
that R2P did not provide any substantive added value more than it predecessor the 
“Humanitarian Intervention” did. 
3.2The Beginning of the Story 
Colonel Muammar El-Qaddafi’s 42 years rule had been characterized by a strict 
limitation on civil liberties, human rights abuses, and the use of torture against his 
opponents (Silander 2013). On February 2011, Qaddafi’s regime came under threat by 
popular uprisings instigated by the Libyan people who took to streets in the eastern 
province of Benghazi demanding substantial change to the political and social 
structure of the regime (ibid). Colonel Qaddafi in return described the protesters as 
"cockroaches" for whom he vowed to search "house to house". He declared publicly 
that the protesters would be "hunted down door to door and executed" and that there 
will be “no mercy and no pity shown" (Zifacak 2012) His use of the word was eerily 
reminiscent of the same words used in a similar context in Rwanda by the Hutu radio 
prior to the massacre of Tutsi in 1994, the massacres that, among other, had propelled 
the coining of R2P later on (Ibid). 
43 
 
Soon, the number of protestors killed soared from hundreds to more than one 
thousand. This violent crackdown by the regime forces on the protestors had resulted 
in a gradual shift in the peaceful character of the demonstrations towards a more 
violent one. The level of violence had then escalated later into a devastating civil war 
in which armed rebel forces demanded bringing the regime down. However, Qaddafi 
forces started to gain strength and territory during their march towards the 
opposition's stronghold of Benghazi. The opposition was weak and unorganized to the 
extent that it might be swept away in Benghazi. The prospect of massacre and atrocity 
in Libya against the civilian "cockroaches" at the hands of the regime’s military 
forces was clear and made the international community became deeply alarmed (Ibid). 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at that time Navanethem 
Pillay described the situation in Libya as "shocking and brutal". According to her, this 
brutality had been the characteristic of the Libyan leadership for more than four 
decades. She urged both the UN Security Council and Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) to respond to those atrocities. On February 25, the Human Rights Council 
established a fact-finding committee to examine the unfolding events and urged the 
General Assembly to expel Libya from Security Council membership. On March 1, 
The General Assembly suspended the Libyan membership. (Zifacak 2012) 
3.3 Resolution 1970 
On February 26, in a prompt response by the Security Council in the wake of 
crackdown on protesters, a swift and decisive action was taken only ten days after the 
beginning of the demonstrations. Tough Measures were imposed on the Libyan 
regime through adopting UNSC resolution 1970. The resolution was unanimously 
adopted under article 4.1 under chapter VII of the UN charter. 
The Security Council resolution, while reaffirming in the preamble its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the national 
unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, deplored what is described as "gross and 
systematic violation of human rights in Libya". The resolution demanded an end to 
the violence, imposed arms embargo on the country, and a travel ban and assets freeze 
on the family of Muammar Al-Qaddafi as well as certain governmental officials. 
Furthermore, the resolution expressed hope that those responsible for grave crimes 
would be held accountable and finally decided to refer the situation to the 
International Criminal Court (un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc 2011). The Security 
Council made it clear for the first time that the demands of the resolution are derived 
from the responsibility of the Libyan government to protect its own people. 
In a dramatic step, the Libyan ambassador to the UN defected from the regime and 
called upon the UN member states to recognize the Libyan Interim Council as the 
legitimate Libyan authority. In a sentimental comment after the adoption of the 1970 
resolution, the Libyan representative at the UN stated that the Council’s action 
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represented a moral support for his people and was a signal that an end must be put to 
the fascist regime in Tripoli (un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc 2011). 
The Qaddafi regime responded through ignoring the UNSC resolution and launched 
sustained attacks on the opposition strongholds; however, they were unable to achieve 
a decisive victory over the dispersed and rapidly mobile rebel forces. However at the 
same time, the opposition forces started gradually losing the momentum under 
Qaddafi’s tanks, aircraft, and heavy armaments attacks (Silander 2013). Therefore, 
calls for assistance were raised by the rebel leaders to ask for military support from 
the international community under allegation of the lack of the military resources 
needed to repel attacks on civilians. The final outcome was that resolution 1970 had 
not had the effect of providing protection for civilians the international community 
hoped for. Subsequently, the debate within the UN was that if no further actions were 
taken, then the widespread abuse against Libyan civilians would continue unabated. 
(Ibid) 
3.4 Resolution 1973  
On March, 12, 2011, a major watershed in the incidents of the Libyan revolution took 
place. The Arab League, the regional organization, unanimously adopted a resolution 
that expressed concern over Qaddafi’s use of military forces against civilians. At the 
same time, it suspended the Libyan membership at the Arab League. More 
importantly, the Arab League requested the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly 
zone over Libya with the aim of stopping attacks against civilians. 
In response to the Arab League’s call, and an appeal from the UN Secretary-General 
Ban-Ki, the Security Council adopted a new resolution; UNSC resolution 1973, on 17 
March 2011, only after twenty days from the adoption of the former resolution UNSC 
resolution 1970. The UNSC resolution was adopted by 10 votes and 5 abstentions. 
The manner of voting could be broken down as follows: countries that voted in favor 
of the resolution were mainly the Western countries; the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Portugal and Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the regional Arab and African 
counties; Lebanon, South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon. From the other side, the countries 
that abstained were Russia, China, in addition to the emerging developing countries 
Brazil and India. Germany had a unique position as it boycotted the Western 
consensus for the first time and abstained from voting. (Berenskoetter, aught between 
Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany’s Abstention on Libya n.d.). 
The UNSC resolution 1973 was very clear in referring to the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It stressed that it is the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libyan population and affirmed that the parties to armed 
conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the 
protection of civilians. The resolution also expressed grave concern at the 
deteriorating situation, the heavy civilian casualties and considered that the 
widespread and systematic attacks taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against 
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civilian population may amount to "crimes against humanity". 
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm 2011). 
In fact, the prompt manner the Security Council reacted to the Libyan situation had 
surprised many. Equally or even more appalling human sufferings in Bahrain, Syria 
and Yemen were ignored for an unexpectedly long time. It took nearly a year for the 
same Council to pass a resolution on Yemen that called for, not to impose coercive 
actions, but for a Yemenis-led political reconciliation process. This double standard 
policy in dealing with similar grave situations raised so many questions regarding the 
presence of real standards for dealing with humanitarian situations. 
The most important and controversial provision of the resolution was that it 
authorized member states acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements to take "all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack". In the same context, the resolution decided to 
establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to 
protect civilians. However, the resolution was very clear in refusing any kind of 
foreign occupation of any form in any part of the Libyan territory. 
(un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc) 
The wording and phrases used in the provisions that authorized intervention in the 
resolution were shocking to many. The standard phrases used in the previous UNSC 
resolutions regarding imposing coercive measures to provide protection for civilians 
under attack was to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence". 
(Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria. 2012) Thus accordingly, it had intentionally 
dropped the word "imminent". Much more, it included a more expansive concept of 
"civilian populated areas". This provided a reason to defend the civilian populated 
areas that were not necessarily in imminent danger from Qaddafi's troops. In the same 
context, no explanation of the phrase "all necessary means" was provided. Therefore, 
the wording of the resolution was ambiguous enough to be interpreted both narrowly 
and broadly (Ibid). The Indian representative at the UNSC stated that the 
controversial and ambiguous nature of the resolution was the reason behind the 
abstention of one third of the Security Council members to the UNSC resolution 1973 
although the same Security Council members did not have a problem with the earlier 
one which imposed sanctions and referred the Qaddafi regime to the ICC.  
3.5 The Launch of the Military Operations 
Immediately after the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1973 France took the 
international lead on how to address the Libyan crisis. On March 17, 2011, on the day 
after the final vote, the then French Foreign Minister held a press conference on Libya 
where he referred that the credibility and honor of the international community was at 
stake and called for an immediate response by the international community (Juppe 
2011) A summit convened in Paris two days later to "support the Libyan people". The 
meetings had resulted in an agreement in which France, the United States, the UK, 
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Italy, Qatar, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Spain agreed to take all 
necessary action, including military, consistent with UNSCR 1973, to implement the 
no-fly provision of UNSC resolution 1973 (State 2011). 
Immediately, a military coalition under the umbrella of NATO began bombing Libyan 
governmental positions. The NATO air forces took out Libya’s air defense systems to 
halt its capacity to launch air strikes on the opposition strongholds (Zifacak 2012) 
However, it became clear after two months from the initial NATO's aerial bombing 
that the Libyan regime resistance was stronger than what had been anticipated. Thus, 
NATO appeared to be stuck in second gear. (Zifacak 2012) The NATO’s military 
leadership became increasingly convinced that the objectives of the military campaign 
cannot be achieved unless the Libyan leadership was toppled (Ibid). In this regard, the 
mandate of the UNSC resolution 1973 authorized the use of all necessary means. 
By the end of the operations, it was clear that it was the Libyan opposition rebels who 
took the advantage of the NATO action (Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria. 
2012). The NATO acted as the air force of the anti-Gaddafi rebels. Furthermore, 
France supplied arms to the rebel fighters in a clear violation of UNSC resolutions 
1970 and 1973 that imposed an arms embargo on all parties in Libya (Ibid). This has 
led the Indian ambassador to the UN "Hardeep Singh" to refer to NATO as the 
"armed wing" of Libyan opposition (Ibid). 
The West’s broad interpretation of the resolution was criticized by the Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who viewed NATO’s intervention has not been 
sanctioned by the UNSC resolution and that the military operations had gone further 
than expected (Silander 2013). The Chinese government also accused France, the UK, 
and the USA of acting beyond the scope of the resolution. The Chinese foreign 
ministry spokeswoman "Jiang Yu" stated that "the implementation of the Security 
Council resolution is meant to offer humanitarian protection, rather than engender a 
greater humanitarian disaster". That is why, she concluded, the Chinese government 
accuses the West of defending its interest in an attempt to gain control over Libyan oil 
resources rather than pursuing humanitarian goals (Ibid). 
3.6 The role of Political Interests in the NATO Intervention in Libya 
The NATO-led intervention in Libya unleashed a torrent debate regarding invoking 
the doctrine of R2P for the first time. In fact, the UN-authorized intervention in Libya 
constituted a watershed in the history of R2P. From the launch of R2P in 2001 till 
2011, R2P remained dormant. For instance, R2P was not invoked in many other cases 
that needed international intervention such as in Darfur, Gaza or Somalia despite the 
presence of suspicions of war crimes and crimes against humanity (M. Nuruzzaman, 
The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013). 
At the beginning of the incidents in Libya, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
considered that the intervention in Libya had marked the "coming of age of the 
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Responsibility to Protect". (Morris, Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the 
swinging pendulum. 2013)   
Although the adoption of the UNSC resolution 1973 has indicated the important role 
that R2P has come to play in international politics (Silander 2013), the debate within 
the Security Council regarding the NATO-led intervention in Libya and the incidents 
in the aftermath of intervention had revealed the need to clarify the ambiguity of R2P. 
One third of the UNSC members abstained from voting on the UNSC Resolution 
1973. The representative of the Russian Federation at the UNSC stated that he had 
abstained because many questions remained unanswered, including how the mandate 
would be enforced and by whom, and what the limits of engagement would be. The 
Russian representative called for alternative means to engage in Libya as the military 
force could lead to negative consequences in Libya and for the region in general 
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm 2011).  
Developing countries members of the Security Council, such as Brazil and India, 
expressed also strong concerns over mandating the use of force. The representative of 
India explained his abstention through stating that "today’s resolution is based on very 
little clear information, including a lack of certainty regarding who was going to 
enforce the measures" (http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm 
2011).  The representative of Brazil shared the same view, he stated that the resolution 
contemplated measures that went beyond that call and that the measures approved by 
the resolution could exacerbate the current tensions on the ground and will cause 
more harm to the civilians that the international community is committed to protecting 
(Ibid). 
In fact, the statements of Western officials regarding the aim of intervention have 
aggravated the already existed fears that R2P is merely a tool that is used to mask the 
political goals of the major powers. Their statements did not show respect to the 
delicate line between the goal of protecting civilians enshrined in the UNSC 
resolution and the goal of regime change. The US representative at the Security 
Council stated; "the United States views that Qaddafi has lost his legitimacy and that 
there is no justification for Qaddafi's leadership (Ibid). The same stance replicated in 
the statements of the French minister of foreign affairs during debating the resolution 
at the Security Council. He maintained; "the inaction in Libya would not only be a 
humanitarian disaster, but would also send a message to “other totalitarian regimes” 
that their brutality would go unanswered”(Ibid). 
At the beginning of the uprising, the African Union initiated a reconciliation process 
between Qaddafi regime and the rebels in April 2011. However, France, Britain and 
the USA did everything to effectively sabotage the reconciliation process. On April 
15, 2011, the British Prime Minister David Cameron, former French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and the US President Barack Obama published a joint statement rejecting 
Qaddafi playing any role in any future arrangements in Libya, as if they put 
themselves in the position of being the actual deciders in Libya with the rebels 
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playing a secondary role. (M. Nuruzzaman, The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: 
Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013) 
Although the aims and objectives of R2P revolve around providing protection for 
civilians in armed conflict, and therefore pursuing the goal of regime is illegal, the 
advocates of the NATO intervention in Libya pleads that paragraph 4 of UNSC 
resolution 1973 which authorizes “the use of all necessary means to protect civilians” 
entails not just stopping international crimes, but it authorizes also stopping Qaddafi’s 
forces from winning the civil war in Libya. Moreover, they argued that the UNSC 
resolution 1973 does not prohibit the targeting of Qaddafi himself but allows it where 
this is deemed necessary to protect civilians and civilian populated areas (Akande, 
What does UN Security Council Resolution 1973 permit? 2011).  
However, despite this previous argument, there is general acknowledgment that 
NATO intervention in Libya went far beyond the initial objectives of protecting 
civilians enshrined in the UNSC resolution 1973  (Zifacak 2012). Ramesh Thakur, 
one of the founders of R2P, viewed that the UN resolution 1973 was crafted both to 
authorize and to delimit the scope of intervention (Thakur, R2P after Libya and Syria: 
Engaging Emerging Powers, 2013) Thus, according to him, although ignoring the 
restrictions in the UNSC resolution 1973 could have been justified on the basis of 
necessity and efficiency, the insistence by NATO members that they fully adhered to 
the UN mandate as the resolution allowed "the use of all necessary measures to 
protect civilians" is not credible (Ibid). Therefore targeting Qaddafi forces directly, as 
well as violating the UN’s arms embargo by supplying weaponry to the rebels, 
constituted a transparent effort of regime change. The UN resolution cannot become 
the pretext for imposing external political preferences such as regime change (Ibid). 
In the same context, Gareth Evans, the co-chair of the ICISS commission, viewed that 
although R2P’s application in Libya had been an apparent success, many would have 
been much more comfortable if NATO had been confined to its role; so after 
neutralizing the Libyan air force and halting the ground forces marching to Benghazi, 
to keep its brief mandate in maintaining the no-fly zone and being prepared to attack 
whenever civilians or civilian areas were being put at risk by reachable targets. 
(Evans, Interview: The R2P Balance Sheet after Libya’ in The Responsibility to 
Protect: Challenges and Opportunities in light of the Libyan Intervention. 2011) 
This chapter argues that political consideration played the major role in motivating the 
NATO intervention. The humanitarian motives indeed played a part in the decision to 
intervene in Libya. However, the humanitarian concerns represent a necessary but not 
a sufficient cause for intervention (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). Indeed Qaddafi was a 
tyrant. However, the intervening states maintained close relations with Qaddafi until 
his hold on power became doubtful under the mass demonstrations against him. 
Immediately afterwards, the NATO states broke with Qaddafi. This remarkable 
suddenness of the Western break with Qaddafi makes this break appear hypocritical 
and opportunistic, rather than morally based (Gibbs 2016) 
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The UN Human Rights Council’s Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya presented evidence of international crimes, specifically crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed by Qaddafi’s forces in Libya. Despite the 
aforementioned reports on the commitment of war atrocities in Libya, the inclination 
of many within the Pentagon and the White House in the early days of the incidents 
had been to avoid military involvement in Libya (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ).  
Basically, Libya has a strategic geopolitical status within the calculations of the 
Western policy makers for many reasons. The first one is that although Libya is not 
located in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, its hydrocarbon reserves place it in the top ten of 
world oil reserves with 39.1 billion barrels according to the 2006 British Petroleum 
statistical review of World Energy. It additionally enjoys significant exploitable 
reserves of natural gas. European countries especially Germany and Italy were highly 
dependent on Libyan hydrocarbons (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). 
The second reason was that Colonel Qaddafi over his 42 year existence was more than 
a minor irritant to NATO. He even continued to cause difficulties in the post-
December 2003 period of improved relations. The Libyan regime was perceived as a 
rogue regime by successive US administrations. Therefore, the use of force would 
help in toppling a regime that constitutes a threat to the US Security (Fernandes 
2013). Policy makers in NATO countries came to realize that an opportunity to 
effectively install a more reliable and pliable regime in Libya had presented itself, 
with all the benefits that might bring in terms of reliable access to huge hydrocarbon 
reserves (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ) 
More importantly, with the launch of the demonstrations of the Arab Spring there was 
widespread anxiety among the business community about the unrest that was 
sweeping the Arab world, oil companies have welcomed Western military 
intervention as a stabilizing factor for Libyan oil; and also as a show of force for the 
whole Arab world, to demonstrate that Western powers still exert control (Gibbs 
2016).   
The French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the British Prime Minister David 
Cameron were the frontrunners among NATO leaders in calling for intervention. 
France in particular has been one of the strongest advocates calling for recognizing 
the legitimacy of the Benghazi-based rebels. According to the STRATFOR Global 
Intelligence Center, the French interests in the Libyan intervention can be categorized 
into two main categories: domestic politics and intra-European relations. The 
domestic political interest was that French President wanted to represent his 
administration as standing in the same line with the Arab Spring revolution. At the 
onset of the Arab Spring, Paris stalled on recognizing the protesters in Tunisia and 
Egypt as legitimate. For instance in the Tunisian case, the French Foreign Minister 
Michele Alliot Marie offered the Tunisian government official help in dealing with 
the protesters. Three days later, the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was 
forced to flee the country. The French President has his own Muslim voters to 
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consider, including a sizable minority from North Africa. This audience had a 
particularly negative reaction to Paris’ handling of the revolution in Tunisia.  
Therefore the French intervention could be perceived from the lens of 
overcompensation for an initially European handling of the Arab spring revolutions.  
The other motive for the French enthusiasm for intervention according to the 
STRATFOR Global Intelligence Center was that France aimed from its intervention 
to reassert its role as the most militarily capable European power. Since late 2009, 
under the effect of the Greek economic crises, Germany has sought to use its 
economic power to reshape EU institutions to its own liking. Although Germany has 
worked to keep France appraised of the reforms on every step of the way, French 
public opinion saw that Paris has had to take a backseat and accept most of 
Germany’s decisions as a fait accompli. The criticism has been leveled against 
Sarkozy of having been reduced to Merkel’s yes-man. Thus, the intervention in Libya 
was a way to reassert to the French people and Europe that France still leads the 
Continent on foreign and military affairs. Therefore, if Europe intends to be taken 
seriously as a global power, it will need the French military power. 
In fact, France had many other interests in Libya considering Libya’s largely 
unexplored energy reserves. French energy major Total used to exist in Libya during 
Qaddafi but not to the same extent as Italian “ENI” or even German “Wintershall”. 
But the situation could be improved, French energy companies could stand to profit 
from helping rebels take power in Tripoli. The military sales were another aspect to 
be looked through. After the European Union lifted its arms embargo against Libya on 
2004, Paris has benefited between 2004 and 2011 approximately half a billion dollars 
worth of arms. However, in 2010 alone, the Italian government was in negotiation for 
more than a billion dollars out of arms sales to Tripoli, and it seemed that the Rome-
Tripoli relationship was overtaking Paris’ efforts in Libya prior to the intervention.  
Great Britain has not been as aggressive about pushing for the Libya intervention as 
France, but it still has been at the forefront of the coalition. London has also 
significant interest in Libya, namely energy. STRATFOR Global Intelligence Center 
points out that till 2010, the British energy major British Petroleum (BP) had no 
production in Libya although in 2007 it agreed with Tripoli to drill onshore and 
offshore wells under a one billion deal. The negotiations were finalized after the 
Scottish government decided to release Lockerbie convicted Abdel Baset Al-Megrahi 
on humanitarian grounds in August 2009. Al-Megrahi was expected to die of prostate 
cancer within months of his release but presumably was still alive till 2011. The 
British government came under heavy criticism for Al-Megrahi’s release. British 
media speculated that the decision represented an effort to kick-start BP’s production 
in Libya. BP announced in 2009 that it planned to invest 20 billion in Libyan oil 
production over the next 20 years. However, till 2011 no progress was achieved in 
this regard. 
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The May 2010 Macondo well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico made BP in a vulnerable 
situation. The United States accounted for a quarter of BP’s total hydrocarbon 
production in 2010. The disaster cost BP 17.7 billion worth of losses in 2010, and the 
company also has had to set up a 20 billion compensation fund. Estimates of potential 
further spill-related costs range between 38 billion and 60 billion, making BP’s future 
in the United States uncertain. Therefore the BP’s Libya strategy was more urgent. 
The disaster also allowed BP’s competitors to complain about its potential future 
offshore operations. The Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini argued that until the 
investigation into the Macondo well disaster is completed, BP should refrain from 
drilling off Libya’s shore in the Mediterranean Sea. The complaint was more than 
likely an attempt by ENI to complicate BP’s Libya operations by questioning its 
environmental record in North America. Therefore, with no oil production in Libya 
and arms sales, London could gain by the removal of Qaddafi and that the United 
Kingdom could substantially benefit from new leadership in Tripoli.  
Italy enjoyed a privileged relationship with Qaddafi, from energy to weapon sales to 
its being a main destination for Qaddafi’s investments. However, Italy was the third 
largest component in the international coalition in Libya. Italy has been one of 
Qaddafi’s major arms suppliers since the EU arms embargo was lifted in 2004, a step 
for which Italy strongly lobbied. Italy was in the process of negotiating a 1.05 billion-
worth of military contracts before the rebellion began in Libya. On the same context, 
the cozy relationship has allowed Rome to negotiate a deal on securing its seas from 
an unchecked influx of migrants, both a national security and domestic political issue. 
Geographically, Italy is one of the closest European countries to Libya, with the 
island of Lampedusa, a destination of choice for migrants fleeing North African, only 
225 kilometers from Libya. Because of its geographic proximity, the energy company 
ENI began operating there in 1959 and never left the country, even when the rest of 
the West rebuffed Qaddafi in the 1980s due to his association with terrorism. This 
commitment to Libya allowed Rome to negotiate lucrative energy and arms contracts 
after the sanctions on Libya were lift in 2003. Till 2011, ENI had a number of key 
energy assets in Libya, Libya accounts for some 15 percent of ENI’s total global 
hydrocarbons output, with oil production of 108,000 barrels per day and natural gas 
production of 8.1 billion cubic meters in 2009. 
Despite the lucrative relations with the Qaddafi regime, Italy supported the coalition 
against Qaddafi. The Italian air force conduct patrols over Libyan airspace and Italy 
offered the use of seven Italian airbases to the coalition aircrafts. STRATFOR Global 
Intelligence Center argues that the reasons for this shift in Italian government position 
from Qaddafi because Rome did not want the Libyan intervention to be a Paris-
London affair particularly when the United States withdraws from leading the 
operations, leaving Italy’s energy and security interests at the mercy of two countries 
looking to gain the upper hand in the post-Qaddafi Libya. However, Rome continued 
to hedge its policy. Rome has emphasized that its jets operating over Libya had 
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managed to jam Libyan air defense radar networks “without firing a single shot,” 
according to an Italian air force announcement on March 22, 2011. 
The French and British keenness on expanding their energy and business interests 
once rebels assume power in Libya explains Rome’s reluctance to allow France to 
lead a command structure concurrent with NATO’s. Rebel leaders themselves have 
stressed that economic ties will be calibrated to reflect the support that the various 
European countries have offered the grassroots uprising. These sorts of statements are 
what Rome feared the most. As a response, the press in Italy has claimed that Rome 
was seeking an official NATO role in the intervention so as to prevent French-UK 
“activism”. Replacing Qaddafi with a rebel leadership grateful to London and Paris 
but suspicious of Rome would threaten Italian interests. Also his replacement with an 
unknown regime or unstable environment that resembles the tribal warlords of 
Somalia would lead to unchecked migration flows and an insecure business 
environment. In the same time participating in the coalition was risky too, as Qaddafi 
could wind up clinging to power and deciding to seek revenge against Italy for joining 
forces with the United States, France and United Kingdom against him despite the 
2008 friendship treaty.  
In light of the aforementioned; the thesis concludes that there are solid grounds to 
argue that the humanitarian discourse of NATO amounts to no more than justificatory 
propaganda. Interests defined as power was the motivating factor behind NATO 
operation not the humanitarian goals. Basically, NATO’s intervention in Libya was 
not in line with the original spirit of R2P (M. Nuruzzaman, The “Responsibility to 
Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria. 2013). Mohamed Nuruzzaman 
argues that the incidents in Libya had even produced irreparable damages to the R2P 
doctrine in three distinct ways; the first one is the quick resort to military force as 
force was used with an astonishing speed in clear violation of the ICISS report 
provisions which stresses that force can be used as the last resort. The second is the 
double commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the last but not least 
is what he describes as the morally and ethically unacceptable post-intervention 
policy towards Libya as NATO had left Libya after intervention plagued with internal 
divisions and the absence of unification or reconciliation efforts between the different 
opposition factions (Ibid). 
Regarding the last point, the current situation in Libya five year after intervention 
remains gloomy by all means. There is an unprecedented deterioration in all fields in 
Libya whether in the humanitarian or the security aspects. The former Special 
Representative of the UNSG to Libya Bernardino Leon, during his briefing to the 
Security Council three years after the international intervention in Libya gave a bleak 
assessment of the overall situation in Libya. He stated that Libya is “getting very 
close to the point of no return”. He referred to the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that two million people may have been 
affected by the conflict in Libya. More than 330,000 are considered to be particularly 
at risk, with the sum of 37,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. He further stressed that 
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extremist groups with radical ideologies, associated with al-Qaeda have been on the 
rise since the end of the armed conflict in 2011, the Islamic state has found fertile 
ground in the growing post-revolution political instability, capitalizing also on the 
weakness of state institutions and state security sector. The steady influx of foreign 
nationals has bolstered its ranks and now threatens to introduce yet another dimension 
to the conflict in Libya. (http://unsmil.unmissions.org 2015) 
In fact, the response of the international community in the post intervention period 
was very minimal and came only after six months from the launch of the military 
operations through establishing the UN Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL). 
However, after three years from the establishment of UNSMIL, the head of the UN 
mission stated before the Security Council that despite the initial sense of optimism 
that accompanied the mission’s establishment, the critical situation has brought the 
country closer to the brink of a protracted conflict and that the Libyan people find 
themselves nowhere closer to realizing their hopes and aspirations for a better future. 
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11788. 2015) 
Therefore, as the thesis argues, the dominance of the political interests over the 
humanitarian motives has damaged the initial optimism that accompanied invoking 
R2P for the first time. As Thakur successfully argued that the gaps between the initial 
expectations of R2P and the absence of accountability between those who mandated 
the intervention and those who executed it has tarnished the image of R2P (Thakur, 
R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, 2013)  
3.7 Conclusion 
The NATO intervention in Libya represented a stark development in the short history 
of R2P. UNSC resolution 1973 marks the first time the council authorizes the use of 
force for humanitarian protection purposes against the will of a functioning state 
(Bellamy 2011). However, despite the initial optimism that had accompanied 
invoking R2P for the first time, the developments in the Libyan case during and after 
intervention indicated, in the thesis view, that R2P has not succeeded in establishing 
new rules and conditions for intervention to neutralize the dominant role of the 
political interests while deciding intervention in case of humanitarian crisis. 
The NATO insistence on pursuing the goal of regime change instead of merely 
working to protect civilians as enshrined by the UNSC resolution, as well as the 
irresponsible post intervention policies demonstrate that it was the political 
consideration that mainly motivate the international intervention in Libya not the 
humanitarian ones. Humanitarian motives while played a part in the decision of 
intervention, it represented merely a necessary but not a sufficient cause for 
intervention. The humanitarian discourse of NATO amounted to no more than 
justificatory propaganda. Interests defined as power was the motivating factor behind 
the NATO operations in Libya. 
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Chapter Four 
The Non-Intervention in Syria and its Negative Impact on R2P  
-------------------------------- 
"The human cost of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic is 
immeasurable. The Syrian state has manifestly failed to protect its citizens 
from mass atrocities. War crimes and crimes against humanity have been 
committed on a massive scale. Many Syrians have suffered multiple violations 
and abuses from different actors. The scale of human suffering has grown as 
the conflict has escalated". 
The report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic released in February 2015. 
4.1 Introduction 
The ongoing civilian suffering in Syria represents a stark example on the current 
vulnerable status of the R2P, it re-affirms the thesis' argument that R2P has failed in 
establishing clear conditions and parameters for intervention in case of humanitarian 
crises. Despite the fact that consecutive international reports stated clearly that the 
Syrian regime is unable or unwilling to protect its people, no collective action was 
taken by the international community according to the R2P. The failure of the 
international community to halt civilian sufferings or to reach a political solution in 
Syria indicates that the mechanism of the international response to the incidents of 
mass atrocities is still flawed. 
The reluctance of the international community to respond to the Syrian crisis 
compared to the NATO’s prompt engagement in Libya, has triggered comparisons 
between the two cases. Despite that Bashar al-Assad has been also fighting anti-
regime protestors as Qaddafi did, and despite the fact that Syria witnesses 
humanitarian conditions similar or even worse than that in Libya, the Syrian case has 
provoked less international and regional enthusiasm for intervention. Therefore, 
critics rightfully questioned why the international community responded briskly and 
forcefully in the oil-rich Libya but have failed to take a similar attitude towards Syria 
(Isaac n.d.). 
 The long lasting standstill with regards to the Syrian crisis in comparison to the hasty 
intervention in the case of Libya has made commentators seek justifications for the 
reasons why the international responsibility was not invoked in Syria alongside the 
Libyan case. The negative shadows of absence of the international community 
response to the Syrian case had led to the conclusion that it was not the R2P itself that 
explained the action in Libya and the inaction in Syria. (T. G. Weiss, Military 
Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn't Killed It 2014) Other factors such as the geopolitical 
factors, the regional alignment, the sectarian diversity and the unity of the opposition 
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was decisive rather than the sole humanitarian causes in making the decision of 
intervention in Libya which were absent in Syria (Ibid)  
This chapter will discuss the current gloomy situation of the R2P in light of the lack 
of the international community will/ability for collective intervention in Syria. It will 
start by going back to the beginning of the incidences in March 2011 when peaceful 
demonstrators took down to streets demanding political changes. The chapter will 
shed light on the current humanitarian situation in Syria after more than five years 
from the beginning of the crisis as was documented by the reports of UN 
organizations. Although the international reports stated clearly that Syrian regime is 
unable or unwilling to protect its civilians, no collective action was taken by the 
international community according to the international responsibility principle.  
4.2 The Beginning of the Story and the Humanitarian Scene in Syria 
Protests erupted in Syria in February 2011 immediately after those that had occurred 
in Tunisia and Egypt. Protests raised initially demands in relation to issues such as 
poverty, lack of freedom, democracy, restrictions upon freedom of expression…etc. 
(Zifcak, The responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012) In mid-March, large 
peaceful demonstrations erupted in the city of Dara'a in southern Syria after a group 
of children were detained and tortured by government intelligence agents due to 
accusations of painting anti-government graffiti on public buildings (Ibid). According 
to the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, although the protests were peaceful at the beginning, the Syrian 
government forces responded through opening fire on the demonstrators (UNHRC 
2015) As a consequence, protests spread all over the country. 
The demonstrations were further met with a violent, often lethal, response from the 
government. The Syrian government argued that the protesters were merely terrorist 
groups which had opened fire at their forces (UNHRC 2015). In April 2011, a report 
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) reported the use of 
artillery fire against unarmed civilians, arbitrary arrests, the torture of protesters, 
lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and others. The UNHCR report referred 
also to incidents of shooting of medical personnel in their attempts to aid the 
wounded, raids against hospitals and mosques. 
 Accordingly, on April 29 2011, due to the deteriorating situation, the Human Rights 
Council adopted Resolution S-16/1 which strongly condemns the use of lethal 
violence against peaceful protesters, it called the Syrian government immediately to 
put an end to any and all human rights abuses, demanding the immediate release of all 
political prisoners and the permission of the international reporters to Syria (Zifcak, 
The responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012) 
In a trial to placate both the protestors and the international community, President 
Bashar al-Assad, formed a new government on the 16
th
 of April, lifted the state of 
emergency that had been in place since 1963, and recognized the right to peaceful 
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protest but under strict regulations. However, the public saw the aforementioned 
reformations as too little and too late (Ibid). One week later, the largest 
demonstrations yet to be seen had occurred across the country. More than one 
hundred people were killed in the aftermath of the demonstrations due to the violent 
crackdown. The regime started since then to deploy the army backed by armored 
personnel to quell the demonstration. (Ibid) 
By the end of 2011, the peaceful demonstrations of the Arab Spring in Syria had 
mutated into a bloody armed uprising and then to a fully-fledged civil war (Zifcak, 
The responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012). The report of the 
independent commission stated that "the situation has degenerated from legitimate 
popular aspirations into a conflagration of an unparalleled scale and magnitude of 
civil war". By February 2012, after one year from the eruption of the protests without 
materializing any of its demands, the peaceful demonstration has mutated into a civil 
war. Armed groups continued to attack government-held neighborhoods and areas. 
The report of the independent commission states that the conduct of the actors is 
characterized by a complete lack of adherence to the norms of international law. 
It is believed that currently there are around one thousand opposition armed groups 
working in Syria, commanding an estimated 100,000 fighters. However, many of 
those groups are small and operate on a local level, but a number have emerged as 
powerful forces with affiliates across the country or formed alliances with other 
groups that share a similar agenda. The director of the US National Intelligence, 
James Clapper in February 2014 estimated the strength of the insurgency in Syria at 
somewhere between 75,000 or 80,000 or up to 110,000 to 115,000 insurgents, who 
are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings. 
(service 2014) 
Starting from the year 2014, the scene in Syria was getting worse and stained by the 
predominance of the extremist Islamist groups; two extreme armed groups, the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat Al-Nusra, have gained supremacy 
over the other mainstream opposition groups. The two armed militias were designated 
as terrorist groups by the UNSC resolution 2170 (2014). Throughout 2014, ISIS took 
over large parts of the north-eastern regions in Syria. It has recently made inroads in 
Hama and Homs governorates. In June 2014, ISIS proclaimed itself a “caliphate state" 
(UNHRC 2015). 
The anti-government armed groups have also intentionally targeted civilian localities 
either in retaliation for government operations or owing to perceived support of those 
localities for the government. Minority groups considered to be harboring government 
loyalties or perceived as benefiting from government support have also been attacked 
by non-State armed groups. (UNHRC 2015) Unfortunately, this tragic scene allover 
Syria remained the main character of the Syrian scene till the moment when this thesis 
was written. 
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In light of the aforementioned tragedy, on the 5th of February 2015, a report by the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry in the Syrian Arab Republic stated 
that since the eruption of the incidences in Syria, more than 10 million Syrians have 
fled their homes which amount to almost half of the country’s population. More than 
three million people, most of which women and children, have fled the Syrian Arab 
Republic to the neighbouring countries. A further 6.5 million people are believed to 
be internally displaced. Moreover, an estimated number of 10.8 million are in a need 
for humanitarian assistance inside the Syrian Arab Republic, with 4.6 million living 
under siege or in hard-to-access areas (UNHRC 2015) 
Another tragedy took place in Syria, on 21 August 2013 media reported that chemical 
weapons were used during attacks on civilians at Al-Ghouta (Reif Damascus) and 
Khan Al-Assal (Aleppo). The chemical weapons, according to the opposition, were 
used by the government forces and had resulted in over 1,000 men, women and scores 
of children facing a most horrible death (Mendes 2013 ). The Security Council in 
return adopted unanimously resolution 2118 in September 2013, in which it required 
the verification and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. A report released 
by a fact-finding mission appointed by the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to examine the alleged uses of chemical gases as a 
weapon in Syria found that according to the evidence gathered and the laboratory 
results obtained, there are evidences constituting “compelling confirmation” that a 
toxic chemical was used “systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon in Syria.  
The report of the OPCW refers that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing 
conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, not only in the Al-Ghouta 
area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, but also on a smaller scale in Jobar on 24 
August 2013, Saraqueb on 29 April 2013, Ashrafiah Sahnaya on 25 August 2013 and 
Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013 (Nations 2013). The report indicated that from the 
evidences available concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the agents used 
"The perpetrators are likely had access to the chemical weapons stockpile of the 
Syrian military". However, the report could not specify the party that lies behind those 
chemical attacks was (Nations 2013). 
In case the allegations that the Syrian regime was behind those chemical attacks were 
proven, the incident of the usage of chemical weapons in Syria would have been 
violating the norm of the ban of the use of chemical weapon in non-international 
armed conflict (Stahn, Between Law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian 
Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be. 2014). This norm is a fundamental 
norm of international law. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited under different 
bodies of law, including international humanitarian law and international criminal law 
(Ibid). This could be qualified both as a crime against humanity and a war crime 
(Ibid). However, the whole incidents ended up by the acceptance of the Syrian regime 
to dismantle its chemical arsenal while the killing and atrocities went unabated. 
4.3 The International Response to the Syrian Crisis 
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As we can conclude from the previous section, the situation in Syria can be deemed as 
presenting a textbook case for R2P. The ICISS report indicated that a legitimate 
humanitarian intervention must have a "just cause". In the case of Syria, a prima facie 
case consists of well- documented evidence from multiple independent sources that  
Al-Assad regime was unable and unwilling to provide protection for his people. 
Moreover, there are evidences that Al-Assad's forces had intentionally committed 
mass atrocities. However, we will see in this section that R2P remained unable to live 
up to the gravity of the situation on the ground. Although a number of initiatives have 
been introduced to put an end to the five year old conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic 
to date, they all have fallen short of achieving a political solution.  
This section provides that despite the presence of an international consensus on the 
gravity of the humanitarian situation, R2P guidelines still are not able to mobilize the 
international community to react to the gravity of the situation. From the beginning of 
the incidents, the international community has been divided in the Syrian case. The 
US, EU, and most Arab countries have called on Assad to step down. On the other 
side, Russia, China, Iran and even some Latin American countries continued to see 
this as an unaccepted interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country. 
(Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria 2012)  
The UN Secretary General first briefed the council on the deteriorating situation in 
Syria on April 27 2011. The Council while took note of the deteriorating situation on 
the ground, resolved urgently to dispatch a mission to Syria to investigate all alleged 
human rights violations, and called upon the Syrian government to cooperate with its 
inquiries. However, neither the Security Council’s nor the Human Rights Council’s 
condemnation had any effect on the ground; the killing became more prevalent, the 
demonstrations grew larger and more widespread. (Zifcak, The responsibilty to 
protect after Libya and Syria. 2012) 
Western nations sought further intervention more than what was mentioned in the 
resolution. In September 2011, six month after the beginning of demonstrations, four 
countries; France, the UK, Germany and Portugal took the lead and proposed a 
resolution that condemns the grave and systematic violations of human rights and the 
use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities, the proposed draft resolution 
did not include any provisions that call for coercive measures. On October 4, nine 
members voted in favor of the draft resolution, four non-P5 members abstained 
(Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa) and two Permanent members (China and 
Russia) voted against the proposal. 
Russia mentioned four claims for its veto: First, the resolution did not pay enough 
respect to Syria’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second, the resolution 
was founded upon the logic of confrontation not the logic of calling for a peaceful 
settlement of the crisis. Third, Russia asserted that both sides bear the responsibility 
of the violence in Syria. Fourth, Russia referred to the NATO intervention in the case 
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of Libya and referred to its possible implications in the case of Syria  (Zifcak, The 
responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012). 
In the same context, emerging developing countries, such as Brazil and India 
remained to adopt their position that casts doubts upon the aims and applicability of 
the R2P. The two countries abstained also during the deliberations on the Libyan case. 
South Africa joined them in the Syrian crisis this time and abstained as well as. It 
seems that it was the regional African alignment that prevented South Africa from 
abstaining on the resolution of Libya. Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
were clear in expressing their concern that a Security Council resolution should not 
seek to dictate the nature of the political reform to be imposed on the Syrian 
government as it should remain a domestic issue, they sought to remove what they 
saw as muscular language in the draft resolution (Zifcak, The responsibilty to protect 
after Libya and Syria. 2012) 
The Arab League decided to take the lead this time. The initial serious involvement of 
the Arab League began on the 16
th
 of November 2011. It strongly intervened through 
suspending the Syrian membership in the league and gave the Syrian government an 
ultimatum to comply with the terms of a detailed initiative in three days or it would 
face economic and political sanctions. The sanctions were subsequently imposed. The 
key elements of the initiative were an immediate cessation of the violence, the 
withdrawal of Syrian military forces from the cities, the process of the political reform 
should be accelerated and kept to a strict timeline; a serious dialogue should be 
opened with representatives of the Syrian opposition and finally a team of observers 
from the Arab League should be allowed to enter the country as soon as possible to 
monitor the Syrian regime compliance with the initiative’s terms. The League also 
urged its members to summon their ambassadors from Damascus. On the 22
nd
 of 
December 2011, the Syrian government agreed to receive 150 Arab League monitors. 
They were deployed throughout the country to determine the extent of the compliance 
of the Syrian authorities with the Arab League initiative. However, by the end of 
2011, their presence does not seem to have had any impact on reducing the violence 
whatsoever. (Zifacak 2012) 
Throughout January 2012, the Security Council met again to engage in negotiations 
aiming at adopting a new resolution. The foundation for the negotiations this time was 
a draft resolution presented by the Arab League. At the heart of the draft resolution 
laid a plan for the transition of power. The plan called for the Syrian president to 
delegate his authorities to his vice president, the formation of a national unity 
government, and that the new government to hold transparent and free parliamentary 
and presidential elections under international observation. The draft resolution also 
urged the Syrian government to cooperate with the Arab League’s observer mission; it 
encouraged all states in the region to impose economic sanctions upon the al-Assad 
regime and proposed that the regime’s implementation of a Security Council 
resolution be reviewed within 15 days of its adoption and that the Security Council 
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should consider the adoption of further measures to stop the violence. (Zifcak, The 
responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012) 
The Arab League’s draft resolutions did not pass voting. Russia and China expressed 
major concerns regarding the resolution. They viewed that the demand for President 
Assad to stand aside would constitute a substantial incursion upon Syrian sovereignty. 
Moreover, the provision that allows the Security Council might take further,-
unspecified- measures against the regime can be a hidden invitation for external 
military intervention resembles the Libyan case (Zifacak 2012) 
 In the last attempt to save the Arab proposal, Morocco, the then Arab member of the 
Council, proposed another diluted resolution. The resolution stated explicitly in the 
preamble that nothing in the resolution authorizes coercive measures to be taken 
against Syria pursuant to article 42 of the UN Charter. The detailed steps towards the 
transition of power in Syria contained in the Arab League draft were removed. The 
paragraphs encouraging states to impose sanctions upon Syria disappeared. In its final 
form, the resolution demanded that Syrian authorities withdraw all military and militia 
forces from cities and towns and allow full and unhindered access to the League of 
Arab State monitors. Finally, it supported an inclusive, Syrian-led political process to 
address the Syrian people’s legitimate aspirations. (Zifacak 2012) 
The vote on the resolution was scheduled for the 4
th
 of February 2012. On the eve of 
February 4, the Syrian authorities launched rocket attacks upon the rebel-held city of 
Homs without distinction between rebel fighters and civilians. It was one of the 
bloodiest days since the beginning of the uprising, the total number of the killed 
people soared around six thousands (Zifcak, The responsibilty to protect after Libya 
and Syria. 2012). On the morning of the 4
th
 of February, the draft Security Council 
resolution was put to the voting, thirteen Security Council members voted in favor of 
it. However, Russia and China vetoed it. The Russian and Chinese delegations 
described the resolution as unbalanced. The reason behind their veto was because that 
the resolution failed to condemn both the Syrian authorities and the armed rebels 
equally. Both countries accused Western nations of masking their intent to seek 
regime change in Damascus. (Ibid)  
Till the moment this thesis was written, despite the notable initiatives that were 
introduced to reach a political solution, and despite the fact that some of these 
initiatives were launched under the umbrella of the UN system such as the Geneva 
process or the six point peace plan of the UN Special Envoy Kofi Anan, unfortunately 
all those initiatives faced the same fate as the previous UN resolutions. The Security 
Council, due to the absence of the consensus among the major powers, failed to pass 
any decisive resolution that was able to make an end to the civilian sufferings in 
Syria. 
On the 27
th
 of March 2012 a notable initiative was presented by the Joint Special 
Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, Kofi 
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Annan. The six-point peace plan principally called upon the government of the Syrian 
Arab Republic to engage in an inclusive political process, to cease military hostilities, 
and to allow humanitarian aid to areas affected by the fighting.  Al- Assad regime 
agreed to the six-point plan.  Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 
2042 on April 14, 2012, supporting the ceasefire. A week later, another Security 
Council resolution 2043 was adopted establishing the UN Supervision Mission in 
Syria (UNSMIS) and the deployment of up to 300 additional unarmed military 
observers (P. R. Williams, preventng mass atrocities crimes, the Responsibilty to 
Protect and the Syrian case. 2012). However, despite the initial optimism when both 
parties, the regime and the opposition, declared their preparedness to abide by the 
plan, on 16 June 2012 the mission was suspended when the hostilities remained 
unabated. 
Another important event in the attempts to find a political solution to the crisis was 
what is known as the "Geneva communiqué" or the final communiqué of the Action 
Group for Syria that was signed in June 2012. This communiqué remains one of the 
most serious attempts and a reference for those who are willing to seek a political 
solution to the conflict. The communiqué provides a road map for a peaceful transfer 
of power through the establishment of a Transitional Governing Body (TGB) with 
executive powers. 
Although Geneva communiqué provided a reference and a framework for a political 
settlement, contentious issues remained unresolved, including the scope and nature of 
the opposition’s representation in any transitional arrangement and al-Assad’s role 
and authorities in the transitional phase. Those issues remain deeply contentious in 
any further negotiations. After years of negotiations and persistent diplomatic 
initiatives, the Syrian crisis remains far from reaching a political solution. 
As discussed above, the international community tried multiple rounds of UN-
brokered peace plans. On the contrary, the violence in Syria has continued to 
intensify, attacks on civilians have increased, and the regime has started to rely on 
heavy military weapons such as cluster bombs and helicopter gunships (P. R. 
Williams, preventng mass atrocities crimes, the Responsibilty to Protect and the 
Syrian case. 2012).Therefore, in light of the aforementioned, the thesis argues that 
R2P does not provide substantive added value.  
4.4 The Role of Political Considerations in the Syrian Crisis. 
The absence of the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria casts 
serious negative shadows on both the credibility and applicability of R2P. Zifcak 
viewed that the current state of paralysis of the Security Council had affected the 
“credibility of R2P” (Zifcak, The responsibilty to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012), 
while Nuruzzaman argued that although R2P had come of age with NATO’s 
intervention in Libya, it has had a tragic death with the Security Council’s inability to 
initiate actions on Syria (M. Nuruzzaman 2013). According to Nuruzzaman, the death 
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of R2P in Syria has been rendered inevitable by NATO’s abuses in Libya, and 
therefore the doctrine is doomed to a bleak future (Ibid). 
The reality on the ground reveals that after Libya, R2P has stalled; it has not been 
used in Syria or Yemen or in any other places where more egregious crimes against 
humanity were and are being committed (M. Nuruzzaman 2013). Justin Morris 
observed that during the Security Council debates over Syria the reference to the R2P 
has been limited (Morris, Libya and Syria:R2P and the spectre of the swinging 
pendulum, , 2013) He illustrates that the statements made during UNSC deliberations 
over Syria suggest that R2P did little to galvanize states to uphold their 
responsibilities and therefore he argued that the effect of R2P was far smaller than is 
often claimed. During the twelve publicly recorded meetings between October 2011 
and April 2013, explicit or clear references to the R2P were made by only seven 
Council members: Colombia, France, Togo, Rwanda, Japan (twice) and Brazil.  It is 
notable that those members mentioned only the first and second pillars of the 
responsibilities. On the same context, the only explicit Russian and Chinese reference 
to R2P in the UNSC was made when both countries suggested that the international 
community was alarmed by the prospect that Libya might become a model for future 
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect (Ibid).  
In fact, the Syrian crisis has highlighted the current limitations of R2P (P. R. 
Williams, preventing mass atrocities crimes, the Responsibilty to Protect and the 
Syrian case. 2012)  It was argued that the lack of action in the Syrian case will not 
only affect R2P but it will further damage the credibility of the UN and its 
institutions, as well as who rely on it to play an effective role in the protection of 
human rights (Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria 2012)  
The ICISS report states that for the international intervention to occur according to 
R2P it should have reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting the 
humanitarian suffering. It asserts that the consequences of action should not be worse 
than the consequences of inaction (ICISS, pp XII). In this regard several comments 
have been made on how "difficult" and "different" the Syrian case is; for instance, 
Gareth Evans, the Co-founder of the R2P, noted that Syria has a very different 
geopolitical environment from the Libyan case, a strong Syrian armed forces, a strong 
Russian commitment to the Assad regime, no Arab League unanimity in favor of 
tough actions is existing, which means that any intervention would be difficult and 
bloody. (Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria 2012)   
Indeed, the Syrian scene is much more complicated than Libya. There are significant 
minorities in Syria: the Christians, the Druze, the Kurds and, above all the Alawites, 
who are in varying degrees might see al-Assad regime as a better option than the 
unknown and feared alternatives (I. Williams 2012) These fears are based on the 
sense that in the case of an international intervention there are increasing prospects of 
imploding Syria with different Sunni, Alawite, Druze creating their own safe havens 
within the country's borders. This could result also in inviting extremists from 
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different countries to have a safe heaven in a region that is very close to Europe 
(Mendes 2013 ).  
However, after five years of the conflict without an adequate response from 
international community, these fears have in fact become a reality. More importantly, 
it can be argued that if the R2P cannot provide an international mechanism that is 
capable of halting atrocities in a massive crisis such as the Syrian crisis, so what is the 
aim or what is the use of R2P then? This thesis views that inventing a responsible 
mechanism for humanitarian intervention that prioritizes the humanitarian factors 
over the political ones would have been able to save lives and bloodshed in Syria and 
would have been able also to keep the unity and the diversity of the Syrian state rather 
than the current ongoing civil war in Syria.    
Unfortunately, it was of much striking to see the extent of the negative influence of 
the NATO intervention in Libya during the UN Security Council’s deliberations over 
Syria. (Morris, Libya and Syria:R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum, , 
2013) The Russian representative insisted to his fellow Council members that "the 
situation in Syria cannot be discussed in the Council separately from the Libyan 
experience". The Libyan case has been cited as a reason for not applying R2P in the 
case of Syria. The Russian and Chinese representatives had received assurances prior 
to NATO's action in Libya, however such assurances were not respected (Ibid). 
(Nasser-Eddine, How R2P failed Syria 2012) Therefore, eventually it was the Syrians 
who have paid the price of NATO excesses in Libya. (Thakur, R2P after Libya and 
Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers 2013) 
Moreover, the NATO’s prompt engagement in Libya compared to the reluctance of 
international engagement in the Syrian case has inevitably triggered comparisons 
between the two cases. Despite Bashar al-Assad has been also fighting anti-regime 
protestors as Qaddafi did, and despite that Syria witness humanitarian condition 
similar or even worse than that in Libya, the Syrian case has provoked less 
international and regional enthusiasm for intervention. Therefore critics questioned 
why the international community responded briskly and forcefully in the oil-rich 
Libya but have failed to take a similar attitude towards Syria (Isaac n.d.)  
The long lasting standstill with regards to the Syrian crisis, compared to the hasty 
intervention in the case of Libya, has made commentators seek justifications for the 
reasons why the international responsibility was not invoked in Syria alongside the 
Libyan pattern. The negative shadows of the Syrian case had raised the argument that 
it was not the R2P itself that explained the action in Libya and the inaction in Syria 
(T. G. Weiss, Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn't Killed It 2014). Other factors, 
such as the geopolitical factors, the regional alignment, the sectarian diversity and the 
unity of the opposition was decisive rather than the sole humanitarian causes in 
making the decision of intervention in Libya which were absent in Syria (Ibid)  
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The Russian and the Chinese positions from the Syrian case can be perceived from the 
scope of the statements of their representatives at the Security Council. The Russian 
and the Chinese representatives as continued to block any resolution with muscular 
provisions in Syria, criticized the use of pseudo-humanitarianism as a pretext for 
intervention such as what happened in Libya. They pleaded that they refuse any 
externally imposed solutions that could dictate the shape of the political 
transformation in a sovereign country (I. Williams 2012)  
In fact, the Russian and Chinese position towards Humanitarian Intervention and R2P 
can be framed within a rational argument rooted in statist international law (Davies 
2015). In his first presidential address to the Russian Federation’s Federal Assembly 
in 2000, Russian President Putin emphasized that the action by the Western powers 
under the pretext of humanitarian intervention was often no more than mere attempts 
to infringe the sovereign rights of states and a legacy of the Cold War (Ibid).  
The Syrian case reflected an important development in Russia’s foreign policy. The 
accretion of the Russian material power and diplomatic weight in recent years has 
reinforced certain assumptions of the Russian role in shaping the international order. 
Russia is aware that the future response of the international community to 
humanitarian intervention and R2P will be shaped by the outcome of the Syria 
conflict (Davies 2015). Therefore, it has invested enormous political capital in the 
conflict. The Russian stance has been accompanied by value-based narratives which 
fundamentally challenge Western liberalism (Ibid.) 
The domestic and foreign political interests of Russia played an important role in 
shaping its position towards the Syrian case. Basically, Russia aimed from its policy 
in Syria to strengthen its international and regional influence and affirming its 
legitimacy in the changing global order (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). Regarding the 
global and the regional influence in the Middle East, the Russian only Mediterranean 
naval base at the Syrian coastal city Tartus and its newly built airbase near Latakia, 
alongside with the significant trade relationships with Syria under al-Assad regime, 
weigh heavily in the Russian calculations towards the Syrian crisis. (Davies 2015).  
More importantly, the Russian commitment to a global order which praises 
sovereignty of incumbent rulers remains to a large extent an external expression of the 
Russian domestic state order. At the Russian domestic sphere, there is an 
overwhelming conviction that since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 and 
especially after the 2004 "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the U.S and the EU are 
engineering the overthrow of governments they find unsuitable. The Russian 
leadership feared that something similar could happen to Russia itself through 
encouraging revolutions in one of the republics of the Russian Federation to weaken 
or to dismantle it. A scenario that is close to what happened in 1991 during the fall of 
the Soviet Union (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). Therefore, the message of Russia by 
standing up for the Syrian regime is that neither the West nor even the UN is able to 
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change a government of a sovereign country.  Such factors combine to count in the 
mind of Russian leaders than the lives of many thousands of Syrian civilians (Ibid) 
Therefore, in light of the aforementioned, Russia persistently rejected the idea that 
Syria is a failed state or the claims that the Syrian rebel groups constitute a coherent 
force capable of taking over al-Assad regime. Russia pleaded that the only unifying 
factor for the rebels is their insistence on al-Assad’s removal  (Davies 2015). It 
described the conflict there as a civil war where external intervention would result 
only in a spiral of violence and potential spillover into the wider region (Ibid). 
However, Moscow reiterated in the meantime that its goal is not to protect al-Assad 
himself but its position stems from fears over the possible disintegration of Syria as a 
sovereign, independent, multi-confessional and multiethnic state.  
Russia fears also that a regime change there may either bring Sunni radical groups to 
power or may create a power vacuum in this very vital location in the Middle East 
(Ibid). Indeed, no government wants to see Al-Assad regime replaced by a radical 
Sunni jihadist one. This is exactly the basic common interest that all governments are 
concerned whether pro-Assad, anti-Assad, or even neutral share.   
The pragmatism and rationality have also shaped the US policy towards the Syrian 
case. The US policy in Syria was a reflection to both the domestic political 
determinants, as well as the international and regional equations. Basically, the US 
administration does not want the American army to get bogged down in the Syrian 
quagmire (Katz 2013). Unlike the Libyan case, without boots on the ground, the air 
forces attacks alone will not be able to make an end to the Syrian conflict. More 
importantly, the Obama administration while dealing with the Syrian crisis shares 
serious concerns over Israeli security that served as a motivation for the USA not to 
intervene in Syria. Although al-Assad regime being closely allied to two of Israel’s 
strongest adversaries, Iran and Hezbollah, Israel highly appreciates the fact that al- 
Assad regime both under Hafez and his son Bashar has kept the Syrian-Israeli border 
quiet since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Israel fears that if the Assad regime falls down, 
it will be replaced by Sunni Jihadists regime that will be hostile and that conflict 
along the Syrian-Israeli border might well re-emerge (Katz 2013). 
From the other side, the regional equations in the Middle East are even more 
sophisticated. The conflict in Syria has changed into a proxy war that reflects the 
Sunni-Shi’a polarization in the region. The Arab countries in the gulf region are 
seeking a Syria militarily and diplomatically cut off from Iran.  Iran from its side is 
determined not to let Bashar al-Assad fall as that has the potential of seriously 
disturbing the regional strategic balance against Tehran (Katz 2013).  
In light of the current deadlock of the Security Council and the inability of the 
international community to discharge its responsibilities to end the atrocities against 
the civilians in Syria, it was argued that the current development sounds the death 
knell for the R2P. Currently, it is not only Russia and China that opposed to authorize 
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a resolution that allows a possible intervention;  major emerging developing countries 
started to shift their positions through expressing suspicions from the consequences of 
a possible intervention that could imitate the Libyan experience. Therefore, it was 
argued that the R2P is dead. 
However, despite the gloomy situation of R2P, this thesis adopts the argument of 
Ramesh Thakur that it would be premature to conclude that R2P can be branded as 
‘‘RIP". The external interventions were frequent in the past before the adoption of the 
R2P, and most likely will occur in the future. The choice thereafter is not if 
intervention would take place but whether it would be provisional or rule based 
(Thakur, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, 2013).   
This thesis argues that although the developments after the adoption of R2P reveal the 
parameters and condition for the international response to humanitarian crises 
presented by the ICISS are not sufficient to mobilize and to guide international 
response, these parameters are a step forward in rendering the future decisions for 
intervention more rule-based instead of being merely dominated by political interests.   
4.5 Conclusion 
The ongoing civilian suffering in Syria represents a stark example on the current 
vulnerable status of R2P. It re-affirms the thesis' argument that R2P has not succeeded 
in establishing agreed upon conditions and methods for intervention in cases of 
humanitarian crises. Despite the fact that consecutive international reports stated 
clearly that the Syrian regime is unable or unwilling to protect its civilians, which is a 
prerequisite for the international response, no collective action was taken by the 
international community according to the R2P. The failure of the international 
community to halt civilian sufferings or reaching a political solution in Syria indicates 
that the mechanism of the international response to the incidents of mass atrocities is 
still flawed. 
More importantly, the NATO’s prompt engagement in Libya compared to the 
reluctance to the engagement in the Syrian case has triggered the comparisons 
between the two cases. Despite Bashar al-Assad has been also fighting anti-regime 
protestors as Qaddafi did, and despite that Syria witness humanitarian condition 
similar or even worse than that in Libya, the Syrian case has provoked less 
international and regional enthusiasm for intervention. Therefore, critics questioned 
why the international community responded briskly and forcefully in the oil-rich 
Libya but have failed to take a similar attitude towards Syria (Isaac n.d.)  
The long lasting standstill with regards to the Syrian Crisis in comparing to the hasty 
intervention in the case of Libya has made commentators seek justifications for the 
reasons why the international responsibility was not invoked in Syria alongside the 
Libyan pattern. The negative shadows of the Syrian case had led to the argument that 
it was not the R2P itself that explained the action in Libya and the inaction in Syria 
(T. G. Weiss, Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn't Killed It 2014), other factors 
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such as the geopolitical factors, the regional alignment, the sectarian diversity and the 
unity of the opposition was decisive rather than the sole humanitarian causes in 
making the decision of intervention in Libya which were absent in Syria (Ibid) 
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Chapter Five 
The Lessons Learned and the Way Forward 
---------------- 
"If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide in Rwanda, a 
coalition of states had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, 
but did not receive prompt Security Council authorization, should such a 
coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?" 
The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan’sspeech to the General Assembly, 
September 1999. 
Despite the big aspirations that accompanied the launch of R2P that the international 
community would finally assume its responsibility in responding to humanitarian 
crises, unfortunately the misuse of the R2P in the case of Libya in addition, the 
current deadlock in Syria reveal that the international community remains at the same 
standing point after fifteen years from adoption of the R2P.  
5.1 The Lessons Learned. 
The concept of “Humanitarian Intervention” existed in the past centuries since the 
early rise of the notion of sovereign states. However, throughout these ages, it has 
been an issue of controversy. Throughout centuries,  there was no clear meaning for 
the modalities of the concept of humanitarian intervention; governments used to act 
according to their own perceived interests even if they claim humanitarian motives. 
The cases of intervention, non-intervention, and even the cases of late/ failed 
intervention, raised a lot of criticism. The international relations rivalry and political 
interests played the dominant role in prompting major powers for intervention. 
Following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international 
community began to seriously debate how to react effectively when human rights are 
grossly and systematically violated. Before the end of the twentieth century, a 
landmark case of using force under humanitarian allegations took place. The United 
States and its NATO allies decided to intervene militarily against the sovereignty of 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia without a Security Council authorization claiming 
humanitarian grounds for their intervention. The NATO action in Kosovo received 
fierce criticism as it lacked a firm basis in the UN Charter. The Security Council 
adopted three resolutions under Chapter VII with regard to Kosovo , none of which 
had authorized the use of force by any mean. On the contrary, these resolutions had 
reaffirmed the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
NATO intervention in Kosovo had revealed by that time the need to establish rules 
and regulations to the use of force in the case of humanitarian crises. Despite the 
massive humanitarian crisis, the killing and the deportation of hundreds of thousands 
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of civilians, the international mechanisms were not able to provide an end to the 
civilian sufferings and the reaction came eventually outside the UN umbrella.  
The debate about the legality and the legitimacy of NATO action in Kosovo led the 
government of Sweden to establish of the Independent Commission on Kosovo. The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo reached a stark conclusion on the 
NATO's action. It viewed that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was "illegal but 
legitimate". It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United 
Nations Security Council. However, the intervention according to the commission 
was justified in light of the fact that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. 
The Independent Commission on Kosovo suggests that the experience in Kosovo had 
uncovered the need to close the gap between the legality and the legitimacy. The 
Commission argued that "the time was ripe by then for the adoption of a principled 
framework for humanitarian intervention which can be used to guide future responses 
to imminent humanitarian catastrophes. The report expressed its wish that the General 
Assembly of the UN could adopt such a framework in some modified form as a 
declaration and that the UN Charter to be adapted to this declaration. 
The following year after the NATO intervention in Kosovo and in an attempt to 
promote the principles of “Humanitarian Intervention” through establishing clearer 
parameters and conditions for international intervention, the government of Canada 
together with a group of major foundations announced at the General Assembly of the 
UN the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS coined later the Doctrine of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P).  
The Responsibility to Protect was invented to addresses certain shortcomings in its 
predecessor Humanitarian Intervention. Intervention under humanitarian cases used to 
be too selective or too late. R2P tried to set certain rules and regulations to govern the 
process of the use of force. However, the thesis argues that while R2P advanced the 
debate about humanitarian intervention in many key respects, the end results was that 
R2P became subject to some of the same pitfalls as humanitarian intervention did. 
Despite the huge aspiration that had accompanied the launch of R2P that the future 
humanitarian intervention will be guided be certain rules and regulations rather than 
the mere political interests, the pattern of international intervention after R2P 
remained to be selective and interest-based.  
The ICISS report proposed certain alternatives in case of the paralysis of the Security 
Council but those alternatives were very controversial and later were omitted during 
discussing the doctrine at the UN 2005 World Summit. Moreover, the ICISS criteria 
for the use of force merely represents a replication of the “just war” criteria which 
were itself ineffective and ambiguous as it raised many questions more than it 
answers. Therefore, this thesis argues that R2P do not provide substantive added value 
more the humanitarian intervention did.  
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The most claimed authoritative document on R2P, the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document, is merely a restatement of the already existing norms and standards for the 
use of force enshrined in the UN Charter. Therefore, there is a little ground for 
concluding that in the protection clauses, states intended to establish new legal 
obligations for the protection of populations beyond borders. R2P can represent at 
best a kind of soft law obligation on the UN member states.  
Despite the fact that there is a bunch of international documents on R2P that speaks of 
the collective responsibility of states to protect populations beyond their borders, R2P 
till this moment does not provide any binding legal implications on states (Glanville 
2012). From a legal perspective, none of the various statement and resolutions on R2P 
can be treated as generating binding legal obligations under the classic sources of 
international law. Although a group of legal scholars accept that General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions can contribute to the interpretation of international 
law, others continue to insist that such sources at their best merely play a contributory 
role in the gradual development of customary international law (Ibid). 
The advocates of R2P were keen on emphasizing that R2P is in the best interest of the 
developing countries, (Thakur, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging 
Powers. 2013). However, the concept of R2P drew negative reactions from many 
governments in Asia and Latin America. They perceived the concept as a 
legitimization of military intervention for strong states against weak ones (Seybolt 
2007). The international experience after the adoption of R2P reveals that 
international intervention was too early in the case of Libya and never happened in 
many other cases including the Syrian case. Moreover, the fears of the developing 
countries were borne out in 2003 when the USA tried to justify its invasion of Iraq in 
humanitarian terms after their initial justification that Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction turned out to be false (Seybolt 2007). Therefore, the 
skepticism and antagonism of the developing countries could be viewed from the 
scope that the new doctrine will be used as a tool by powerful countries to intervene 
selectively in the affairs of the weak  
The NATO-led intervention in Libya unleashed a fierce debate regarding invoking the 
doctrine of R2P for the first time. In fact, the UN-authorized intervention in Libya 
constituted a watershed in the history of R2P; from the launch of R2P in 2001 till 
2011 R2P remained dormant. For instance, R2P was not invoked in many other cases 
that needed international intervention such as in Darfur, Gaza or Somalia despite the 
suspicions that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed (M. 
Nuruzzaman, The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in 
Syria. 2013). At the beginning of the incidents in Libya, the UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon considered that the intervention in Libya had marked the "coming of 
age of the Responsibility to Protect". (Morris, Libya and Syria: R2P and the specter of 
the swinging pendulum. 2013)   
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However, despite the initial optimism that had accompanied invoking R2P for the first 
time, the developments in the Libyan case during and after intervention indicate- in 
the thesis view- that R2P has not succeeded in establishing new rules or conditions for 
intervention to neutralize the dominant role of the political interests while deciding 
intervention in case of humanitarian crisis. The NATO insistence on pursuing the goal 
of regime change instead of merely working to protect civilians as enshrined by the 
UNSC resolution demonstrated that it were the political considerations that mainly 
motivate the international intervention not the humanitarian ones. 
In fact, the statements of western officials regarding the aim of intervention have 
aggravated the already existed concerns that R2P is merely a tool that is used to mask 
the political goals of the major powers. Their statements did not show respect to the 
delicate line between the goal of protecting civilians enshrined in the UNSC 
resolution and the goal of regime change. On 15 April 2011, the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, and the US 
President Barack Obama published a joint statement rejecting Qaddafi playing any 
role in any future arrangements in Libya, as if they put themselves in the position of 
being the actual deciders in Libya with the rebels playing a secondary role. (M. 
Nuruzzaman, The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in 
Syria. 2013) 
The aims and objectives of R2P merely revolve around providing protection for 
civilians in armed conflicts; therefore, the goal of regime change is illegal. There is 
general acknowledgment that NATO attacks went far beyond the initial objectives of 
protecting civilians enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 1973. The UNSC resolutions 
should not be used as a pretext for imposing external political preferences, such as 
regime change. Targeting Qaddafi forces directly, as well as violating the UN’s arms 
embargo by supplying weaponry to the rebels constituted a transparent effort of 
regime change. 
The current situation in Libya refutes the allegations of the humanitarian motives of 
intervention. After five years from intervention, the humanitarian situation remains by 
all means gloomy. There is an unprecedented deterioration in all fields in Libya 
whether in the humanitarian or the security aspects. The former Special 
Representative of the UNSG to Libya Bernardino Leon on his briefing to the Security 
Council three years after intervention stated that Libya is “getting very close to the 
point of no return”.  
The humanitarian motives indeed played a part in the decision to intervene. However, 
this thesis argues that political consideration played the major role in motivating the 
NATO intervention in Libya. The humanitarian concerns represent a necessary but 
not a sufficient cause for intervention (Fermor Winter 2012/13 ). Therefore in light for 
aforementioned gloomy picture in Libya, the thesis believes that there are solid 
grounds to argue that the humanitarian discourse of NATO amounts to no more than 
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justificatory propaganda. Interests defined as power were the motivating factor behind 
NATO intervention not the humanitarian goals.  
The ongoing civilian suffering in Syria represents another stark example on the 
current vulnerable status of the R2P. It re-affirms the thesis' argument that R2P has 
not succeeded in establishing clear conditions and parameters for intervention in case 
of humanitarian crises. Despite the fact that consecutive international reports stated 
clearly that the Syrian regime is unable or unwilling to protect its civilians, which is a 
prerequisite for the international response, the failure of the international community 
to halt civilian sufferings or reaching a political solution in Syria indicate that the 
mechanism of the international response to the incidents of mass atrocities is still 
flawed. 
The NATO’s prompt engagement in Libya compared to the international community 
reluctance to engage in Syria triggered comparisons between the two cases. Despite 
that Bashar Al-Assad has committed mass atrocities as Qaddafi did, and despite the 
fact that Syria witness humanitarian condition similar or even worse than that in 
Libya, the Syrian case has provoked less international and regional enthusiasm for 
intervention. The non-intervention in Syria raised questions why the international 
community responded briskly and forcefully in the oil-rich Libya but has failed to 
take a similar attitude towards Syria (Isaac n.d.).  
The long lasting still with regards to the Syrian Crisis in comparing to the hasty 
intervention in the case of Libya has made commentators seek justifications. The lack 
of the international community response to the Syrian case has advanced the argument 
that it was not the R2P itself that explained the action in Libya and the inaction in 
Syria (T. G. Weiss, Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn't Killed It 2014), other 
factors such as the geopolitical factors, the regional alignment, the sectarian diversity 
and the unity of the opposition was decisive rather than the sole humanitarian causes 
in making the decision of intervention in Libya which were absent in Syria (Ibid).   
The lack of an international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria casts serious 
negative shadows on both the credibility and applicability of the R2P. Zifcak viewed 
that the current state of paralysis of the Security Council had affected the credibility 
of R2P (Zifcak, The responsibility to protect after Libya and Syria. 2012), while 
Nuruzzaman argues that although the R2P had come of age with NATO’s intervention 
in Libya, it has had a tragic death with the Security Council’s inability to initiate 
actions on Syria. Nuruzzaman argues that the death of R2P in Syria has been rendered 
inevitable by NATO’s abuses in Libya, and therefore the doctrine is doomed to a 
bleak future. The reality on the ground reveals that after Libya R2P has stalled; it has 
not been used in Syria or Yemen or in any other places where more egregious crimes 
against humanity were and are being committed. (M. Nuruzzaman 2013). 
This thesis argues that through studying the two main cases of intervention/ 
nonintervention under humanitarian reasons after R2P, political interests, not the 
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humanitarian motives, were the main driving factors for deciding international 
intervention. The patterns of humanitarian intervention after R2P remain selective and 
dominated by political interests that as it used to be before R2P.   
The thesis basically adopts the realist view in international relations. It argues that this 
selectivity in the international response before and after R2P, as was demonstrated in 
the thesis’ chapters, stems from the nature of the international system itself. In the 
absence of a central authority to implement norms such as Humanitarian Intervention 
or human rights, the state's action will be dominated by its interests. Although these 
interests may include an interest in human rights, humanitarian interests, these 
interests alone are rarely sufficient to motivate a state to intervene abroad. For a state 
to conduct forcible intervention in support of human rights, it requires the state to 
expend its resources and place the lives of its military personnel at risk, something a 
state will not likely do in the absence of self-interest. That is why it was not surprising 
to see that in many cases where the humanitarian factor was grave but no political or 
economic concerns of foreign powers, states expressed little interest in forceful 
intervention.  
Martha Finnemore argues that the realist thoughts that focus on the political or 
economic interests does not provide enough justifications to the rapidly multiplying 
cases of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War. She argues that 
many or most cases of intervention occur in states of negligible political or economic 
importance to the interveners and in countries there has no national interests for the 
states bearing the burden of military intervention in most if not all of these cases. She 
argues that none of realist or liberal approaches provide an answer to the question 
what interests are intervening states pursuing. According to her, realism and most 
liberals do not investigate interests; they assume them. (M. Finnemore, Constructive 
norms of humanitarian intervention n.d.). 
However, the thesis claims that it has demonstrated in its chapters that political 
interests dominated the international community response to humanitarian crises. 
States remain to intervene in cases where they have interests in intervention and the 
power to do so. This selectivity plagued state actions under the frameworks of both 
“humanitarian intervention” and the “responsibility to protect”. The thesis views that 
this discrepancy in the reaction of the international community stems not from 
differences in the humanitarian situations of different cases, but from differences in 
the international community's interest to intervene. This interest stems mainly from 
considerations such power and hegemony. As the cases of intervention in Syria and 
Libya suggest, the international response varied even in circumstances that are quite 
comparable. Therefore, we can conclude that R2P did not provide consistent ground 
for intervention in humanitarian crises rather than the humanitarian intervention.  
 
5.2 R2P is not a Dead Idea 
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In light of the current deadlock of the Security Council and its inability to discharge 
its responsibilities to end the atrocities against civilians in Syria, it was argued that the 
current developments sound the death knell for the R2P. However, this thesis argues 
that although the developments after the adoption of R2P reveal that the parameters 
and the conditions for the international response to humanitarian crises presented by 
the ICISS were not sufficient to mobilize and to guide international response, the 
thesis views that the launch of R2P constituted a historical opportunity to promote 
parameters and conditions for the international community to respond to humanitarian 
crisis in an automatic way away from any other considerations that could stem from 
particular interests or rivalry among major powers.  
 
In fact, despite the multiple setbacks of R2P after Libya and Syria, the thesis argues 
that there is still growing concern at the international fora to the importance of 
strengthening and enhancing the parameters and the conditions of R2P. The Security 
Council during one year (from the 22
nd
 of January 2015 till the 27
th
 of January 2016) 
adopted 13 different resolutions that have references to R2P, these resolutions indicate 
increasing awareness of the intentional community towards the responsibilities of the 
sovereign states, as well as the international community on the protection of civilians 
in armed conflicts. 
Moreover, from 2009 till 2015 the General Assembly of the United Nations organized 
annual panel discussions on the topic of the Responsibility to Protect. On 26 February 
2016, the president of the UN General Assembly convened a thematic Panel 
discussion to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Responsibility to 
Protect at the 2005 World Summit. Over 100 member states attended the event. The 
majority of statements emphasized the importance of prioritizing prevention by 
strengthening early warning systems and enhancing international coordination when 
responding to risks of potential mass atrocities (www.UN.org). 
In the same context, fifty members of the General Assembly from both the global 
south and the global north, which constitutes more than one quarter of the UN 
members, appointed a National Focal Point for the R2P to participate in the Global 
“R2P Focal Point Network”. Rwanda was the 50th member to appoint a senior-level 
official as an R2P focal point to participate in the Global Network of R2P.  
Nowadays there are increasing numbers of international networks for the prevention 
of atrocity crimes, such as the Global R2P Focal Point Network, the Regional 
Committee at the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, the Latin 
American Network on Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention and the Global Action 
against Mass Atrocity Crimes. They are all helping in identifying ways to assist states 
to better protect their populations and they are all actively enhancing the 
understanding of risk factors and help preventing a downward spiral towards 
systematic violence. 
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Therefore, we can argue, as the UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson’s did 
during the General Assembly’s thematic panel discussion titled “R2P From 
commitment to implementation”, that despite the different setback of the R2P, the 
conceptual, political and institutional development of the R2P constitutes constant 
work in progress. Thus, the thesis concludes that the door is still open to enhance the 
work for developing the R2P.   
5. 3The way forward 
In light of the current vulnerable situation of R2P, many ideas were introduced to 
enhance the effectiveness of R2P. In this regard, Brazil introduced what it labeled as 
the "Responsibility While Protecting" (RwP) as a new doctrine aims at providing 
better strict regulations before and after the use of force.  
The RWP proposal was introduced in November 2011during the debate over the 
NATO intervention in Libya and whether the UNSC mandate had been extended or 
not. The permanent delegate of Brazil to the UN presented a letter to the United 
Nations Secretariat calling for what is labeled as the "Responsibility While 
Protecting." The proposal aimed at presenting some parameters and conditions to 
govern and to oversee the process of the use of force in cases humanitarian crises.  
The Brazilian paper proposed two key principles. The first one is to formulate an 
agreed upon set of guidelines to help the UNSC to achieve consensus in the future 
debate over humanitarian crises, otherwise to seek another alternative in case of the 
Security Council paralysis through invoking the role of the General Assembly via the 
"Uniting For Peace". The second element of the proposal is through monitoring and 
reviewing the authorization of the use of force, as well as the post intervention 
mechanisms, in order to ensure that the Council has an oversight role over the 
operations during implementing the post conflict reconstruction phase. 
The Brazilian proposal (RWP) was outlined in the letter by the permanent 
representative of Brazil to the United Nations to the UN Secretary General as such: 
 R2P and RwP should evolve together based on agreed fundamental principles. 
 The international community should stress that prevention is always the best 
policy; meanwhile the international community must be rigorous in its efforts 
to exhaust all peaceful means available. 
 The use of force must always be authorized by the Security Council in 
accordance with Chapter XII of the charter. However, in exceptional 
circumstances, the General Assembly could authorize intervention under 
Resolution 377 (Uniting for Peace). 
 In the event of the use of force, actions must be judicious, proportionate and 
limited to the objectives established by the UNSC. Those objectives must be 
observed throughout the entire length of the authorization from the adoption of 
the resolution to the suspension of the authorization by a new mandate. 
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 Finally, the Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom 
authority is granted to resort to force. (UNSG 2011) 
We can infer from the above that the Brazilian proposal is merely general principles 
to guide the process of issuing the authorization of the use of force and then to 
monitor the steps of intervention without going into the details. These general 
principles include the call to formulate an agreed upon set of guidelines to help in the 
future debate over intervention in humanitarian crises, the proposal to monitor and to 
review the post intervention mechanisms, and finally to ensure that the UNSC has an 
oversight role over the operations during implementing the post conflict 
reconstruction phase. The paper itself does not provide answers on how to implement 
those guidelines and principles. 
However, the aforementioned ideas constitute - in the view of this thesis - a brave call 
for further developing the existing rules and conditions to guide the use of force under 
humanitarian allegations rather than a call for a brand new doctrine. The doctrine of 
RWP highlights almost the same principles of R2P such as the primacy of the 
preventive measures over other pillars of intervention, as well as the supremacy of the 
role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. What is 
important about the Brazilian paper - in the view of this thesis - is that it threw a stone 
in the still water of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria to initialize a 
debate on how to move forward in light of the current vulnerable status of R2P after 
the two cases. 
5:4  A Call for an International Conference on the R2P 
Finally, in light of the weakness of R2P, the thesis calls for an international 
conference to address the current vulnerability of R2P and the way to move forward. 
The incidents of the Libyan and Syria had demonstrated the need for a "legitimacy 
criteria" to guide decisions whether on authorizing or overseeing the international 
military intervention and its consequences. 
The report of the ICISS proposed certain principles and precautions for a military 
intervention under humanitarian reason to be legitimate, such as the just cause, the 
presence of right intention and the presence of reasonable aspects of success in halting 
the civilian sufferings. However, these criteria are merely replication of the “just war 
“criteria which were itself ineffective and leaves the future cases of intervention to be 
judged according to wide range of different considerations.  
The variation of the international community’s response in the cases of Libya and 
Syria had revealed that these criteria simply do not live up to the level of clear 
standards and conditions as it can be variably interpreted from one situation to 
another. What is really needed, in the view of this thesis, is to reach a consensus on 
adequate legitimate criteria for intervention to act as guidance for the Security 
Council during implementing its mandate to maintaining international peace and 
security. Those new parameters should be applicable to different conflicts in order to 
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render the decision of international intervention rule based and keep it away from the 
risk of manipulation by political interests. 
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